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A New Prescription for the Opioid Epidemic: 360Degree Accountability for Pharmaceutical
Companies and Their Executives
REBECCA A. DELFINO†
We can no longer ignore this—a national crisis resulting in almost one million American deaths,
costing hundreds of millions of dollars, ravaging the health care system, and devastating state
and local communities. This narrative describes the COVID-19 pandemic and something else:
the epidemic of opioid addiction and abuse. In the last twenty years, the opioid epidemic claimed
the lives of more than 700,000 people at the cost of more than 500 billion dollars to the economy.
The COVID-19 pandemic has made the opioid epidemic worse, causing a staggering increase
in opioid-related overdose deaths. Even now, on average, 140 people die every day from an
opioid overdose, making it a leading cause of injury-related death in the United States. And 70%
of those deaths involve a prescription opioid.
There is a growing sense that those responsible for the opioid epidemic, specifically drug
companies and their executives, have escaped responsibility for their dangerous and deceptive
practices in manufacturing and marketing opioids. Although they have confronted civil lawsuits,
the pharmaceutical industry has faced virtually no criminal scrutiny; only a couple of companies
and executives have ever been criminally charged for the devastation that opioids have caused.
This raises questions: Given the increasing number of opioid overdose deaths nationally, why
are charges and convictions of drug companies and their executives so rare? And why have
existing legal mechanisms not worked to punish the improper manufacturing and marketing
practices and curb the epidemic? Their misconduct continues because no single federal law
exists to prosecute pharmaceutical companies and their executives for causing the epidemic.
And existing laws are ineffective; they fail to criminalize the type of conduct that caused the
epidemic, contain elements prohibitively difficult to prove, or impose minimal penalties that fail
to deter bad actors. Thus, the drug industry has persisted in dubious practices unfettered by civil
litigation, government enforcement actions, and fines. This Article seeks to examine these issues
and others. It is the first in legal scholarship to offer a concrete and omnibus solution grounded
in federal law to address the pharmaceutical industry’s misconduct. The novel 360-degree
solution proposed here—the “Controlled Substance Manufacturing and Marketing
Accountability Act”—will deter and punish those pharmaceutical companies and their
executives who provided misleading information to government regulators and used deceptive
practices in marketing opioids to the public. It also recognizes that when properly prescribed,
these drugs provide essential relief for pain and suffering. Thus, this Proposal seeks to address
prior misconduct and point the way forward to avoid the next drug epidemic.

† Clinical Professor of Law at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. I am grateful and indebted to Yeva
Mikaelyan for her research assistance, Loyola Law School for its generous support of faculty scholarship, and,
as always, my family for their patience, indulgence, and encouragement. This Article is dedicated to my brother,
Luis Delfino.
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INTRODUCTION
At the dawn of the 2020s, the United States faces simultaneous crises—the
global COVID-19 pandemic and the opioid epidemic. They share
commonalities. Both crises have caused hundreds of thousands of deaths,
destruction to the economy, and devastation to state and local communities. Both
crises also bring together the same key actors: the American healthcare system,
government policymakers and regulators, and the pharmaceutical industry. But
the similarities end there. The country has marshalled the government, private
sector, and medical and scientific communities en masse, in warp speed to
combat the COVID-19 pandemic. The national reaction to the opioid epidemic
is pale in comparison. Even though the COVID-19 pandemic’s effects have
exacerbated the opioid epidemic, our collective response is relatively anemic.1
Why? If we can turn the tide on the pandemic and beat back a mutating virus,
why have we been unable to alter the course of the opioid epidemic—a humanmade crisis? The answer is not straightforward or simple; it requires a critical
examination of the political economy, private business interests, and innate
human desire to avoid pain.
Finding the answer requires an acknowledgment of a failure of
accountability for the opioid epidemic. It is widely accepted that those
responsible for instigating the opioid crisis—drug companies and doctors2 who
prescribe opioids—have not been held accountable.3 Although some doctors and
other prescribers have faced criminal exposure for contributing to the opioid
epidemic,4 pharmaceutical companies have encountered little criminal scrutiny,
and drug company executives have experienced even less. Even though
pharmaceutical companies and pharmacies have faced civil litigation5 for their

1. See Megan Brooks, US Drug Overdose Deaths Hit a Record High, CDC Reports, MEDSCAPE MED.
NEWS (Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/942917 (documenting that COVID-19 has
resulted in an increase in opioid-related overdose deaths and addiction since early 2020). A national tracking
system at the University of Baltimore has identified nearly an 18% increase in suspected drug overdoses from
March through May 2020. See ALIESE ALTER & CHRISTOPHER YEAGER, OVERDOSE DETECTION MAPPING
APPLICATION PROGRAM, COVID-19 IMPACT ON US NATIONAL OVERDOSE CRISIS (2020),
http://www.odmap.org/Content/docs/news/2020/ODMAP-Report-June-2020.pdf.
2. See Rebecca A. Delfino, The Prescription Abuse Prevention Act: A New Federal Statute to Criminalize
Overprescribing Opioids, 39 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 347, 347 (2021) (addressing the role of doctors’ opioid
prescription practices in causing the opioid epidemic, chronicling the shortcomings in the law to hold
overprescribing doctors criminally accountable and proposing to criminalize the conduct).
3. See House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and Reform, Dec. 17, 2020,
https://www.rev.com/transcript-editor/shared/Li70HMjsidbxdgdKMGt_
KoYz5ThLh65uOETXJF0Ltez4OLcp5Q671xghqrTOkuwJK1psJgW3Y6LXUAt3JFf0eT7T-BA?. In the first
ever appearance under oath by Sackler family members before Congress, Oversight and Reform Committee
members expressed outrage at Purdue Pharma and members of the Sackler family in fueling the nationwide
opioid epidemic by flooding the market with the highly addictive painkiller, OxyContin. Id.; see also Ronald
Hirsch, The Opioid Epidemic: It’s Time to Place Blame Where It Belongs, 114 MO. MED. 82, 82 (2017).
4. See Delfino, supra note 2 (describing the history of criminal cases against doctors who over prescribe
opioids).
5. More than a dozen pharmaceutical companies and pharmacies are the named defendants in the National
Prescription Opiate Litigation, which has consolidated thousands of civil lawsuits pending against opioid
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opioid manufacturing and marketing practices, it is rare for them and their
executives to face criminal charges6 for the devastation that opioids have caused
throughout the United States. Instead, the industry persisted in manufacturing
and marketing practices undeterred by government warning letters, deferred
prosecution agreements, civil fines, and criminal misdemeanor penalties.
One case is emblematic of these issues. In December 2019, a federal jury
in Massachusetts returned guilty verdicts against the drug company, Insys
Therapeutics, and several of its executives, including the company founder John
Kapoor, for multiple violations of federal law for illegal drug distribution and
marketing practices related to a conspiracy to distribute the company’s fentanylbased medication, Subsys.7 The prosecutor showed that the company used
improper marketing tactics, including bribing doctors to prescribe Subsys to
patients who did not need it.8 The convictions were unique, marking the first
time in American history that prosecutors used federal racketeering laws to
impose criminal liability for violations of the Controlled Substance Act (“CSA”)
on high-ranking individual corporate executives.9 In light of the convictions, the
individual defendants faced up to thirty-three years in prison.10 However, the
judge imposed sentences of three to five years and vacated several convictions,
observing that, although fraudulent, the conduct did not violate federal drug
laws.11
This situation raises several questions. First, given the increasing number
of opioid overdose deaths, why are charges against and convictions of
pharmaceutical companies and those who run them so uncommon? Second,
what legal, ethical, and regulatory mechanisms exist to address the opioid crisis
and, in particular, the manufacturing and marketing practices of companies like
Insys Therapeutics and its executives? Why have the existing legal mechanisms
not brought the industry wrongdoers to justice or deterred their deceptive

manufacturers, distributors, and pharmacies across the United States into one suit in the Northern District of
Ohio. See In re National Prescription Opiate Litigation, 290 F.Supp.3d. 1375 (US.Jud.Pan.Mult.Lit. 2017). The
plaintiffs are more than 2,500 state governments, local governments, native tribes, and individuals who are
seeking relief for the defendants’ role in creating, perpetuating, and profiting from the opioid epidemic. Id.; see
also Sammy Almashat, Ryan Lang, Sidney M. Wolfe & Michael Carome, Twenty-Seven Years of
Pharmaceutical Industry Criminal and Civil Penalties: 1991 Through 2017, PUB. CITIZEN (Mar. 14, 2018),
https://www.citizen.org/wp-content/uploads/2408.pdf.
6. See, e.g., U.S. v. Purdue Fredrick Co., 495 F. Supp.2d 569, 572 (W.D. Va. 2007); Gabrielle Emanuel
& Katie Thomas, Top Executives of Insys, an Opioid Company, Are Found Guilty of Racketeering, N.Y. TIMES
(May 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/02/health/insys-trial-verdict-kapoor.html.
7. Memorandum and Order on Defendants’ Motions for Judgment of Acquittal and for a New Trial at 19,
U.S. v. Babich, No. 1:16-cr-10343-ADB (D. Mass. 2016) [hereinafter Memorandum and Order].
8. Id. at 5, 11.
9. Peter J. Henning, RICO Offers a Powerful Tool to Punish Executives for the Opioid Crisis, N.Y. TIMES,
(May 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/23/business/dealbook/rico-insys-opioid-executives.html.
10. See Memorandum and Order, supra note 7, at 19.
11. Id.; Chris Villani, Insys Judge Wonders If Potential Punishment Is Too Harsh, LAW360 (Jan. 13, 2020,
2:16 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1233650/insys-judge-wonders-if-potential-punishment-is-tooharsh.
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practices? And more to the point, why did the judge decide she was required to
vacate the convictions in the Insys Therapeutics case?
This Article seeks to examine these issues and others, and it is the first
Article in legal scholarship to offer a concrete and omnibus solution grounded
in federal law. This Article proposes a new 360-degree response: the “Controlled
Substance Manufacturing and Marketing Accountability Act”12 (“CS MAMA”),
aimed directly at those pharmaceutical companies and their executives who
provided fraudulent information when submitting their drugs for approval to the
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) and who employed deceptive practices
in marketing their opioid drugs to prescribers and the public.
Part I of the Article describes the evolution of the human relationship to
opium-based drugs and early legal efforts to regulate it. The root causes of the
opioid epidemic are also described. The discussion focuses on the driving
force—the pharmaceutical industry and its four-decade effect on research, the
government, and the perception of pain. This Part explains how we got from the
medically acceptable practice of prescribing opioids and other controlled
substances for legitimate medical purposes such as acute pain and palliative care
to where we are now: hundreds of thousands of drug overdose deaths resulting
from addiction to prescription opioids.
Part II considers the current federal laws and ethical frameworks available
to address pharmaceutical companies’ dubious and fraudulent manufacturing
and marketing practices. Even though no single federal law exists to prosecute
pharmaceutical companies and their executives for their roles in causing the
opioid epidemic, companies are regulated and occasionally prosecuted under the
CSA,13 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,14 and False Claims Act.15 This Part
examines the few cases, in addition to the Insys Therapeutics case, that have
been brought against industry wrongdoers under these legal frameworks.16 It
explores the reality that even when prosecutors have brought charges under the
existing law, the cases are hard to win because of challenges in proving the
requisite intent. These statutes also fail to target misconduct specific to the
pharmaceutical industry and its executives.
Further, the few convictions obtained for low-level offenses resulting in
civil penalties have not proven to be an effective deterrent to future bad conduct,
nor have they halted the opioid epidemic. Part II examines the shortcomings in
the current approaches used to remedy the problem and asserts that responses
under existing federal law are inadequate. Consideration is also given to the
solutions proposed by other scholars and policymakers to impose criminal
culpability on the pharmaceutical industry, such as the Racketeer Influenced and

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

The text of CS MAMA is set-forth in the Appendix to this Article.
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(E)(i), (c)(2)(A).
Id. §§ 333(a)(1), (b)(1).
31 U.S.C. § 3730(d).
See Almashat et al., supra note 5, at 10.
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Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”)17 or new legislation such Opioid Crisis
Accountability Act (“OCAA”).18 This Part concludes with a critique of the other
solutions that have been offered thus far.
Part III proposes a 360-degree federal response as the right approach. The
conduct of pharmaceutical companies in instigating the opioid epidemic is
multi-faceted; it involved biasing the scientific research and clinical studies,
influencing the government’s drug approval process, manipulating prescribers,
and misleading the public about the addictiveness of opioids. This conduct
requires legislative action to address the full range of industry misconduct. The
new law must punish the corporate entities and their executives’ wrongdoing,
and it must restore and repair the harm done to communities. The CS MAMA
presented here achieves these objectives from every angle utilizing civil fines,
criminal charges, and regulatory penalties. It embodies a comprehensive,
omnibus proposal that draws upon current legal frameworks’ most effective
aspects and bolsters them with additional proposals.
Finally, this Article acknowledges that finding the best solution is both
delicate and consequential. The legal framework offered here is not intended to
end the availability of opioids or destroy the pharmaceutical industry. On the
one hand, opioids are essential medication that can bring vital relief from acute
pain in patients undergoing cancer treatment, recovering from surgery, and
suffering from a terminal illness. Likewise, pharmaceutical companies are
critical partners in our public health care system; they have been on the frontlines
in developing vaccines for COVID-19. On the other hand, opium-based drugs
are highly addictive and have been historically misused. Profit-driven
pharmaceutical companies have a long practice of orchestrating schemes to
manipulate government regulators and policymakers and deceive medical
prescribers and the public. CS MAMA is calibrated to acknowledge this duality.
It seeks to address prior misconduct and point the way forward to avoid the next
drug epidemic.19
I. THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC AND THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
A. EVOLUTION OF THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC AND THE LAW
About 12,000 years ago, Neolithic humans began to cultivate crops and
domesticate animals.20 During this time, humans also figured out that the milky17. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968.
18. Rep. Tulsi Gabbard Re-introduces Opioid Crisis Accountability Act, Opioid Crisis Accountability Act,
H.R. 2917, 116th Cong. (2019); 26 No. 4 FDA Advertising & Promotion Manual News. 7; H.R. 2917, 116th
Cong. § Preamble (2019).
19. This proposal to pharmaceutical companies and their executives to account for their conduct is only a
partial solution. Confronting and in the appropriate case criminalizing the prescribing practices of these drugs is
also warranted. See Delfino, supra note 2, at 408 (proposing a new federal criminal framework—Prescription
Abuse Prevention Act (PAPA) to address conduct of overprescribing healthcare professionals).
20. Neolithic Revolution, HIST., https://www.history.com/topics/pre-history/neolithic-revolution (last
updated Aug. 23, 2019) (last visited Jan. 24, 2022).
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white juice inside the bulbous head of a poppy plant could be dried, ground to
powder, and smoked, the effects of which produced a euphoric relief from
pain.21 The “opium”22 derived from the poppy was used for religious, cultural,
and medicinal purposes in early cultures, spanning the Middle East, Asia, and
Europe.23
In the last 300 years, the powerful effects produced by opium and its use
in medicine and pain relief24 have inspired commerce25 and conflict. For
example, to satisfy the domestic demand for Chinese-produced tea, the British,
through their control of the East India Company, smuggled Indian opium to
China.26 As a result, the Chinese’s addiction rate soared, instigating the Opium
Wars of the mid-1800s.27
Simultaneously, because of its analgesic properties, opium became the
main ingredient in several medicines during the Nineteenth Century including
laudanum,28 the alcohol-laced tincture29 used to address surgical wounds and
treat conditions such as cholera, yellow fever, menstrual cramps, headaches, and
21. BETH MACY, DOPESICK: DEALERS, DOCTORS, AND THE DRUG COMPANY THAT ADDICTED AMERICA 21
(2018). The human body produces its endorphins, which block pain signals by attaching to pain receptors in the
brain. Like natural endorphins, opioids bind to the receptors and block pain signals. Although endorphins work
for only a few minutes at a time, synthesized opioids work for many hours and bind more strongly to the
receptors. Opioids also activate the reward areas of the brain by releasing the hormone dopamine, creating a
feeling of euphoria or a “high.” Id. The effect of opioids is profound and often addictive. See ANNA LEMBKE,
DRUG DEALER M.D.: HOW DOCTORS WERE DUPED, PATIENTS GOT HOOKED, AND WHY IT’S SO HARD TO STOP
3 (2016).
22. The Sumerian, Babylonian, and Egyptian writings contain the first recorded references to the use of
opium which cited the value of opium preparations for the relief of pain. The Sumerians referred to the poppy
as Hul Gil, which means “The Joy Plant.” In Asian cultures, the creation of the poppy and its hallucinogenic
value was attributed to the Buddha, who was said to have cut off his eyelids to prevent sleep overtaking him,
and where they fell, there grew a plant which bore a nodding violet flower which was to give sleep and dreams
to all humans. See Opium, Morphine and Heroin, IMPERIAL COLL. LONDON, https://www.ch.ic.ac.uk/
rzepa/mim/drugs/html/morphine_text.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2022); UNITED NATIONS OFF. ON DRUGS AND
CRIME, A CENTURY OF INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL 15, 18–19 (2008), https://www.unodc.org/
documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/100_Years_of_Drug_Control.pdf; Heroin, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE,
https://www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/heroin (last visited Jan. 24, 2022).
23. UNITED NATIONS OFF. ON DRUGS AND CRIME, supra note 22, at 15, 18–19.
24. The 17th-century pioneer of English medicine, Thomas Sydenham, described opium thusly: “Among
the remedies which it has pleased Almighty God to give to man to relieve his sufferings, none is so universal
and so efficacious as opium.” Samuel Crumpe, An Inquiry into the Nature and Properties of Opium (1783),
https://www.bl.uk/collection-items/an-inquiry-into-the-nature-and-properties-of-opium.
25. In the 1820’s, a group of powerful Boston merchants organized opium-smuggling operations on the
coast of China, which in turn funded the American industrial revolution and evolution of the United States
railroads and factories. Martha Bebinger, How Profits from Opium Shaped Nineteenth-Century Boston, WBUR:
LOC. COVERAGE (July 31, 2017), https://www.wbur.org/news/2017/07/31/opium-boston-history.
26. Takahiro Moritake, The Opium War and Tea, WORLD GREEN TEA ASS’N, http://www.ocha.net/english/teacha/history/opiumwar.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2022).
27. UNITED NATIONS OFF. ON DRUGS AND CRIME, supra note 22, at 18–23.
28. Alexander Hamilton was treated with laudanum to treat a bout of yellow fever as well as the pain he
suffered after his 1804 fatal duel with Aaron Burr. JOHN C. MILLER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE GROWTH
OF A NEW NATION 380 (2004).
29. A tincture is typically an extract of active constituents of plant or animal material dissolved in ethyl
alcohol. See NAT’L MED. CONVENTION AT WASH., D.C., THE PHARMACOPOEIA OF THE UNITED STATES 233
(Philadelphia, Lippincott, Grambo, & Co., 1850).
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other non-specific pain.30 One of the first modern opioids, morphine, was
developed during this time. In 1806, a German apothecary, Friedrich Serturner,
extracted an active ingredient in the poppy juice, which he named morphine.31
He soon recognized that morphine was ten times more potent than opium and
equally addictive, and he cautioned against its use.32 Doctors, however,
continued to prescribe it to treat many different ailments, such as anxiety and
respiratory problems.33 The first major opium-related addiction epidemic
occurred during and after the American Civil War when morphine was used as
a common form of palliative care to treat soldiers’ pain.34 Many soldiers and
veterans became so dependent on the drug that morphine addiction became
known as the “soldier’s disease.”35
In 1898, Henrich Dreser, a chemist working for the drug firm Bayer Co.,
developed Diacetylmorhine, or heroin, based on the work of another chemist
researching non-addictive alternatives to morphine.36 At the time, Dreser
believed heroin was non-addictive and twice as powerful in its pain relief
properties as morphine.37 The Bayer Company pitched heroin as a non-addictive
sedative to treat the symptoms of influenza and other respiratory ailments that
were leading causes of death at the time, such as pneumonia and tuberculosis.38
By 1899, Bayer began commercial production of heroin, selling it in twentythree countries as a safe, pain-relieving, cure-all.39 Heroin was soon realized to
be more addictive than morphine.40 As with most potent and addictive drugs, it
started to be abused by drug users.41

30. See MACY, supra note 21, at 21.
31. Michael J. Brownstein, A Brief History of Opiates, Opioid Peptides, and Opioid Receptors, 90 PROC.
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 5391, 5391 (1993).
32. MARTIN BOOTH, OPIUM: A HISTORY 69 (1996).
33. Renata Ferrari, Michela Capraro & Marco Visentin, Risk Factors in Opioid Treatment of Chronic NonCancer Pain: A Multidisciplinary Assessment, in PAIN MANAGEMENT-CURRENT ISSUES AND OPINIONS, 419–20
(2012). Other doctors, including Dr. Alexander Wood (who invented the hypodermic needle), promoted the use
of liquid morphine, claiming that injecting morphine was less addictive than smoking, or swallowing opium or
morphine. See MACY, supra note 21, at 22.
34. Sonia Moghe, Opioid History: From ‘Wonder Drug’ to Abuse Epidemic, CNN: HEALTH,
https://www.cnn.com/2016/05/12/health/opioid-addiction-history/index.html (last updated Oct. 14, 2016).
35. See Amy Davidson, The “Soldier’s Disease”, NEW YORKER (Nov. 11, 2010),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/amy-davidson/the-soldiers-disease.
36. See Moghe, supra note 34.
37. Id.
38. See MACY, supra note 21, at 24; see Moghe, supra note 34.
39. Heroin was offered as treatment for many conditions from colic in infants to alcoholism to morphine
addiction. ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF HEROIN 4 (David F. Musto, Thomas W. Mauluci & Pamela Korsmeyer eds.,
2002).
40. Heroin, Morphine and Opiates, HIST. (June 10, 2019), https://www.history.com/topics/crime/historyof-heroin-morphine-and-opiates; see also, Women Victims of Morphine: Physicians Discuss Danger in the Use
of the Drug, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 1895), https://www.nytimes.com/1895/10/25/archives/women-victims-ofmorphine-physicians-discuss-the-danger-in-the-use.html.
41. See Moghe, supra note 34. Rather than it performing as non-addictive as advertised, however, heroin
made addiction worse. See MACY, supra note 21, at 24.
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As the effects of morphine and heroin addiction spread, the United States
government started to monitor the distribution, use, and production of opioidbased drugs. The Opium Exclusion Act of 1909 was the first government
regulation of opioids banning the smoking of opioids.42 In 1914, the government
enacted the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act (the “Harrison Act”), requiring
physician and pharmacist approval to distribute opioids.43 The Harrison Act also
required manufacturers, distributors, and importers of narcotics to register with
the Treasury Department and pay taxes on their products.44
Shortly after the Harrison Act became law, two German scientists at the
University of Frankfurt reported that they had synthesized a new opioid,
oxycodone, derived from thebaine.45 The developers of oxycodone hoped it
would provide the same pain-relieving benefits as morphine and heroin without
the harm of addiction.46 In early 1928, the German drug company Merck
introduced a combination product containing oxycodone and ephedrine, which
became known as the “Miracle Drug” in Continental Europe.47 It was widely
used in Europe in the 1930s and 1940s; Germans used it as a battlefield analgesic
during the Second World War.48
In the years after the Harrison Act passage, the United States government’s
regulation of drugs increased as knowledge about the harms and addictive
properties of opioids emerged. In 1924, the Heroin Act criminalized heroin,
banning its manufacture, import, and possession.49 In 1938, Congress created
the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) to monitor and regulate drugs and
their safety before being sold in the United States.50

42. Dale Gieringer, The Opium Exclusion Act of 1909, COUNTERPUNCH (Feb. 6, 2009)
http://www.counterpunch.org/2009/02/06/the-opium-exclusion-act-of-1909.
43. Michael Waldrop, A Little Less Regulation: Why Federal Pain Management Laws Are Hurting State
Efforts to Combat the Opioid, 43 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 881, 890 (2017). The Harrison Act also required
manufacturers, distributors, and importers of narcotics to register with the Treasury Department and pay taxes
on their products. See Moghe, supra note 34.
44. See Moghe, supra note 34.
45. Martin Freund & Edmund Speyer, Über die Umwandlung von Thebain in Oxycodeinon und dessen
Derivate, 94 J. FÜR PRAKTISCHE CHEMIE. 135–78 (1916); WALTER SNEADER, DRUG DISCOVERY: A HISTORY
119 (2005). Thebaine, a minor constituent of opium, is an opiate alkaloid chemically similar to both morphine
and codeine but has stimulatory rather than depressant effects. See WHO Advisory Group, The Dependence
Potential of Thebaine, UNITED NATIONS OFF. ON DRUG & CRIME (Jan. 1, 1980),
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/bulletin/bulletin_1980-01-01_1_page006.html#n05;
Mohammad Moradi, Sara Esmaeli, Saeed Shoar & Saeid Safari, Use of OxyCodone in Pain Management, 1
ANESTHESIOLOGY & PAIN MED. 262, 262 (2012).
46. Amanda Lautieri, Oxycodone History and Statistics, AM. ADDICTION CTRS. (Jan. 4, 2022)
https://drugabuse.com/opioids/oxycodone/history-statistics.
47. Ray J. Deflaque & Amos J. Wright, Scophedal (SEE) Was it a Fad or a Miracle Drug?, 21 BULL.
ANESTHESIA HIST. 12–14 (2003).
48. Id.
49. Richard D. deShazo, McKenzie Johnson, Ike Eriator & Kathryn Rodenmeyer, Backstories on the US
Opioid Epidemic. Good Intentions Gone Bad, an Industry Gone Rogue, and Watch Dogs Gone to Sleep, 131 AM.
J. MED. 595, 597 (2018).
50. Waldrop, supra note 43, at 890.
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During the 1950s and 1960s, the prescription opioids and heroin use
increased despite the known risks of addiction from opium-based drugs.51
Oxycodone was introduced into the United States in the late 1930s but not
widely prescribed until the 1950s when it was combined with aspirin and
released under the brand name Percodan.52 Like heroin, Percodan was touted as
a non-addictive pain-relieving treatment.53 In the second half of the 1960s, the
public’s perception of drugs began to evolve. Drugs, including opiates and
opioids, became symbols of rebellion, social discord, and political dissent.54 As
a result, the government stopped funding scientific research to evaluate their
medical safety and efficacy.55 The 1970s ushered in the “War on Drugs” and
with it a comprehensive regulation of illicit and prescription drugs.56 In 1970,
Congress enacted the CSA to criminalize importation, manufacture, distribution,
possession, and use of controlled substances, finding those substances to have a
substantial and detrimental effect on the American people’s health and general
welfare.57
The government’s response to drug use in the 1970s affected prescribing
practices and the perception of opioids in the medical community. The 1980s
brought the first cases of “opiophobia”—a physician’s fear that prescribing
opioids would cause the patient to become addicted or fear being persecuted for
prescribing the opioids.58
By the mid-1990s, however, the perception of pain and its treatment began
to change. The medical community and patient rights advocates called for robust
assessment and treatment of pain.59 The primary medical report cited as
supportive of this advocacy was a letter from Jane Porter and Dr. Hershel Jick,
which appeared in a 1980 volume of the New England Journal of Medicine.60
51. Id.
52. Kristin Compton, Endo International and American Medical Systems, DRUGWATCH,
https://www.drugwatch.com/manufacturers/endo-american-medical-systems (last updated Mar. 17, 2021); Yael
Waknine, First-Time Generic Approvals: Xanax XR, Dostinex, Percocet, MEDSCAPE (Feb. 3, 2006),
https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/522876.
53. Waldrop, supra note 43, at 890. The trend of increased use of prescription Oxycodone was immediately
followed by an increase in the illegal heroin trade in the United States during this time, as those who became
addicted to Oxycodone continued to chase the high and stave off the withdrawal symptoms—dopesickness—
which resulted when they could no longer obtain their prescriptions of opioids. Id.
54. A Brief History of the Drug War, DRUG POL’Y ALL., http://www.drugpolicy.org/issues/brief-historydrug-war (last visited Jan. 24, 2022).
55. Id.
56. In 1971, President Richard Nixon declared a “war on drugs,” and thus increased the size and presence
of federal drug control agencies and pushed through measures such as mandatory sentencing for drug offenses.
Id.
57. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 (1970). The CSA makes it “unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally
(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a
controlled substance; or (2) to create, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to distribute or dispense, a
counterfeit substance.” Id. § 841(a)(1)–(2).
58. Waldrop, supra note 43, at 891: M. Zenz & A. Willweber-Strumpf, Opiophobia and Cancer Pain in
Europe, 341 THE LANCET 1075, 1075–76 (1993).
59. See Zenz & Willweber-Strumpf, supra note 58, at 1075–76.
60. See Moghe, supra note 34.
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Porter and Jick reported that they had studied the medical records of 11,882
hospitalized patients who, while closely monitored by hospital staff, were
treated with opioids.61 The five-line, one-paragraph letter, which became known
as “Porter and Jick,” concluded that under the highly controlled environment in
a hospital, the risk of addiction was less than one-half of one percent.62 The letter
was subsequently cited to support prescribing opioids regularly to outpatients to
treat non-terminal, chronic pain; it was claimed that the report proved there was
no risk of addiction with opioids prescribed for use in all settings.63
Porter and Jick created a domino effect. In reliance on the perceptions
created by it, the DEA did not prosecute licensed medical professionals for
prescribing opioids unless it appeared they were engaged in drug trafficking.64
Additionally, institutions across the medical community, including the World
Health Organization, advocated for increased opioid prescriptions and pain
monitoring.65
Opioid prescribing skyrocketed. Between 1990 and 1995, prescriptions for
opioids increased by two to three million per year.66 The number of prescription
opioids rose from 76 million annually in 1991 to a peak of 219 million
prescriptions a year by 2013.67 By 2016, nearly 62 million patients had at least
one opioid prescription filled.68 The number of opioid-related overdose deaths
also increased.69 As of 2017, forty-six people die every day because of

61. Id.
62. Derek Hawkins, How a Short Letter in a Prestigious Journal Contributed to the Opioid Crisis, WASH.
POST (June 2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/06/02/how-the-opioidcrisis-traces-back-to-a-five-sentence-scholarly-letter-from-1980/?utm_term=.665071c2634c.
63. Id.; Sarah Zhang, The One Paragraph Letter from 1980 That Fueled the Opioid Crisis, THE ATLANTIC
(June 2, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2017/06/nejm-letter-opioids/528840.
64. See Kathyrn Foxhall, DEA Enforcement Verses Pain Practice, 5 PPM J. (2016),
https://www.practicalpainmanagement.com/treatments/pharmacological/opioids/dea-enforcement-versus-painpractice (highlighting that DEA enforcement efforts in early and mid-2000s focused on small number of doctors,
who effectively acting as drug traffickers, running pill mills).
65. DAVID W. BAKER, THE JOINT COMMISSION’S PAIN STANDARDS: ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION 2–3 (2017);
Mark R. Jones, Omar Viswanath, Jacquelin Peck, Alan D. Kaye, Jatinder S. Gill & Thomas T. Simopolous, A
Brief History of the Opioid Epidemic and Strategies for Pain Medicine, 7 PAIN & THERAPY 13, 16 (2018).
66. Teresa A. Rummans, M. Caroline Burton & Nancy L. Dawson, How Good Intentions Contributed to
Bad Outcomes: The Opioid Crisis, 93 MAYO CLIN. PROC. 344, 346 (2018); Gery P. Guy, Jr., Kun Zhang,
Michele K. Mohn, Jan Losby, Brian Lewis, Randall Young, Louise B. Murphy & Deborah Dowell, Vital Signs:
Changes in Opioid Prescribing in the United States 2006-2015, 66 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY REP. 697,
697 (2017).
67. See BAKER, supra note 65, at 5; see also AVALERE HEALTH, TRENDS IN OPIOID USE: HISTORY,
BACKGROUND,
AND
ORIGINS
OF
THE
EPIDEMIC
1
(2018),
https://avalere.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/11/Avalere-20181030-Opioid-Trends-Brief-FINAL.pdf.
68. See Guy et al., supra note 66. During the first decade of the twenty-first century, prescription opioids
increased rapidly. According to the CDC, “annual opioid prescribing rates increased from 72.4 to 81.2
prescriptions per 100 persons from 2006 to 2010, were constant from 2010 to 2012, and then decreased by 13.1%
to 70.6 per 100 persons from 2012 to 2015.” This 2015 number still remains three times higher than the 1999
prescription number when 180 MME per capita were sold in the United States. See BAKER, supra note 65, at 5.
69. See BAKER, supra note 65, at 5.
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prescription opioid overdoses,70 which is five times higher than in 1999.71 And
the arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic has provided an unanticipated and tragic
boost to the opioid epidemic. Nationwide, authorities report a surge in fatal
opioid overdoses since the spring of 2020.72
The human experience of using and abusing opiates and opioids is
instructive. It reveals the cyclical nature of the human relationship to pain and
our efforts to alleviate it. In the last 200 years, periods of hope following the
development of new opioids that promised pain relief without adverse side
effects are followed by periods of over-use and addiction. What are the driving
forces behind these cycles? And why, given the government’s War on Drugs and
the enactment of the laws like the CSA, has the abuse and addiction evolved into
the current epidemic? The answer requires identifying the constant presence and
behind-the-scenes force in the evolution of the opioid epidemic—the
pharmaceutical industry. The following Subpart explores the industry’s areas of
influence.
B. ROLE OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY IN THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC
Pharmaceutical companies instigated the opioid epidemic in three
interconnected ways: (1) private drug companies took the lead in funding the
scientific research and studies of opioids and in changing the perception of pain;
(2) they exerted political influence on the government’s process of regulating
drugs; and (3) they created a demand for opioids through their aggressive
marketing to prescribers and consumers.
1. Influence of the Industry on Drug Research and the Perception of Pain
Industry-sponsored research into the efficacy and safety of opioids and
funding of pain advocacy groups and organizations fueled the opioid epidemic.
In the late 1940s, the federal government, primarily through the Veteran’s
Administration, sponsored research into various pain medications to treat those
suffering the effects of injuries sustained in World War II.73 However, the

70. Prescription Opioid Data, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/
drugoverdose/data/prescribing.html (last updated Dec. 19, 2018).
71. Id. Opioid related deaths have continued to increase notwithstanding the decrease in prescriptions
because users who are no longer able to obtain their prescriptions have to turn to other illegal, nonprescription
narcotics available on the streets, such as heroin and fentanyl. See Guy et al., supra note 66. A study found that
of those who began using opioids in the 2000s, 75% reported that their first opioid was a prescription drug.
Prescription Opioid Use is a Risk Factor for Heroin Use, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE (Jan. 2018),
https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/research-reports/relationship-between-prescription-drug-heroinabuse/prescription-opioid-use-risk-factor-heroin-use.
72. See Brooks, supra note 1.
73. David F. Musto, Drug Abuse Research in Historical Perspective, in INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE (US)
COMMITTEE ON OPPORTUNITIES IN DRUG ABUSE RESEARCH, PATHWAYS OF ADDICTION: OPPORTUNITIES IN
DRUG ABUSE RESEARCH (1996); A History of the Pharmaceutical Industry, PHARMAPHORUM (Sept. 1, 2020),
https://pharmaphorum.com/r-d/a_history_of_the_pharmaceutical_industry
[https://perma.cc/3VBQ-N2ZU].
The development of new drugs and the growth of the pharmaceutical industry was fueled by funding from the
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government’s sponsorship of research waned in the mid-1960s as the focus
shifted to the enforcement of drug laws.74 The decrease in funding in the last
fifty years detrimentally affected programs that have relied on ongoing support
to maintain research projects.75 It left a void in the knowledge of the safety and
efficacy of opioids that was ultimately filled by the private sector, specifically
the research and studies funded by pharmaceutical companies and trade
groups.76 Without publicly funded research and independent studies, there was
nothing to countervail the industry’s misrepresentation of reports such as Porter
and Jick, which the industry used to promote the marketing of opioids.
The pharmaceutical industry also promoted changing the perception of
pain in the medical community during this time.77 Although before the 1980s,
these opium-based medications had been reserved for severe cancer pain, endof-life care, and acute post-surgical pain, by the mid-1990s, pharmaceutical
industry-funded groups began to raise awareness of the inadequate treatment of
non-cancer pain and underutilization of pharmaceutical opioids. Part of the
marketing strategy for drug companies was to instill a perceived need by making
unsubstantiated claims about the existence of large numbers of people suffering
from untreated chronic pain.78
Thus, the pharmaceutical companies promoted the adoption of pain as the
“Fifth Vital Sign,”79 meaning that the evaluation of pain became a requirement
of proper patient care as important and essential as the assessment of
temperature, blood pressure, respiratory rate, and heart rate.80 The medical

United States government, with the National Institutes of Health seeing its federal funding rise to nearly $100
million by 1956. Brooks, supra note 1.
74. See A Brief History of the Drug War, supra note 54; see also Don Lattin, The War on Drugs Halted
Research into the Potential Benefits of Psychedelics, SLATE (Jan. 3, 2017, 5:55 AM),
https://slate.com/technology/2017/01/the-war-on-drugs-halted-research-into-the-potential-benefits-ofpsychedelics.html [https://perma.cc/K4AQ-HGQT].
75. See Musto, supra note 73; Michelle Llamas, Big Pharma’s Role in Clinical Trials, DRUGWATCH,
https://www.drugwatch.com/featured/clinical-trials-and-hidden-data (last updated Sept. 24, 2021).
76. See PHARMAPHORUM, supra note 73. The development of new drugs and the growth of the
pharmaceutical industry was fueled by funding from the United States government, with the National Institutes
of Health seeing its federal funding rise to nearly $100 million by 1956. Id.; see also Francie Diep, Did
Researchers Who Seek to Relieve Pain Contribute to the Opioid Epidemic?, PAC. STANDARD (May 2, 2019),
https://psmag.com/social-justice/did-researchers-who-seek-to-relieve-pain-contribute-to-the-opioid-epidemic
(describing that history of pharmaceutical company funding for pain research organizations and their studies).
77. Waldrop, supra note 43, at 891.
78. Patrick O’Keefe, The Family That Build an Empire of Pain, NEW YORKER (Oct. 23, 2017),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/10/30/the-family-that-built-an-empire-of-pain.
79. Natalia E. Morone & Debra K. Weiner, Pain as the Fifth Vital Sign: Exposing the Vital Need for Pain
Education, 35 CLINICAL THERAPEUTICS 1728, 1728 (2013).
80. Id.
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establishment81 and lawmakers followed suit.82 In the early 1990s, large drug
manufacturers such as Purdue Pharma, Johnson & Johnson, and Endo
Pharmaceuticals began funding nonprofit groups in pain management medicine,
such as the American Pain Society.
In 1996, the American Academy of Pain Medicine and the American Pain
Society issued statements that opioids should be used to treat patients with
chronic non-cancer pain.83 Furthermore, between 1996 and 2002, Purdue
Pharma funded more than 20,000 pain-related educational programs to influence
physician prescription habits.84 Medical associations also lobbied the
government to allow the use of opioids for all pain treatment, not just for chronic
pain from a terminal illness.85 In 2004, the Federation of State Medical Boards
(“FSMB”) 86 joined the movement by encouraging state medical boards to
scrutinize and punish physicians for under-treatment of pain.87
2. Industry Influence on Federal Government Actors and Regulation
An equally significant factor in the genesis of the opioid epidemic was the
change in the relationship between the federal government and the
pharmaceutical industry. From “1999 to 2018, the pharmaceutical and health
product industry recorded $4.7 billion—an average of $233 million per year—

81. In 1997, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, in collaboration with the University of WisconsinMadison School of Medicine, funded and establish the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations (known as the “Joint Commission”) to develop pain standards for health care organizations to
improve pain management. BAKER, supra note 65, at 3.
82. BAKER, supra note 65, at 2–3. In 1999, based on these standards, California enacted a provision that
required that “‘[e]very health facility licensed pursuant to this chapter shall, as a condition of licensure, include
pain as an item to be assessed at the same time as vital signs are taken. The pain assessment shall be noted in the
patient’s chart in a manner consistent with other vital signs.’” In October of 2000, the United States Congress
passed H.R. 3244, tit. VI § 1603 which contained similar provisions. Id. at 3.
83. Rummans et al., supra note 66, at 345; Jones et al., supra note 65, at 15.
84. Art Van Zee, The Promotion and Marketing of OxyContin: Commercial Triumph, Public Health
Tragedy, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 221, 225 (2009).
85. See Laurie Tarkan, New Efforts Against an Old Foe: Pain, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2000),
https://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/26/science/new-efforts-against-an-old-foe-pain.html
[https://perma.cc/6D35-BAQW]; BAKER, supra note 65, at 3;
86. The FSMB is a national non-profit organization that represents the seventy-one state medical and
osteopathic boards of the United States and co-sponsors the United States Medical Licensing Examination. See
About FSMB, FED’N OF ST. MED. BDS., https://www.fsmb.org/about-fsmb (last visited Jan. 24, 2022). According
to its website, the FSMB “supports its member boards as they fulfill their mandate of protecting the public’s
health, safety and welfare through the proper licensing, disciplining, and regulation of physicians and, in most
jurisdictions, other health care professionals.” Id. The FSMB published a book, subsidized by drug
manufacturers that outlined polices designed to encourage the broad use of opioid for non-terminal patients.
John Fauber, Follow the Money: Pain, Policy, and Profit, MEDPAGE TODAY (Feb. 19, 2012),
https://www.medpagetoday.com/neurology/painmanagement/31256. The FSMB’s policies were developed by
several individuals with ties to narcotics manufacturers. Id.
87. See generally Diane E. Hoffmann & Anita J. Tarzian, Achieving the Right Balance in Oversight of
Physician Opioid Prescribing for Pain: The Role of State Medical Boards, 31 J. OF L., MED. & ETHICS 21 (2003)
(describing the Oregon Medical Board’s 1999 discipline of physician for failure to prescribe adequate pain relief
medication).
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in lobbying expenditures” at the federal level.88 As of 2020, the industry spent
one billion dollars more than any other special interest group or industrial sector
on lobbying and political contributions.89
The funding has directly influenced the approach of policymakers and
regulators.90 Before the 1980s, the FDA required drug manufacturers to
demonstrate that their products were both safe and effective before they were
marketed.91 With the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, however, the federal
government deregulated many sectors of the economy, including the
pharmaceutical industry.92 The Reagan Administration cast the FDA regulatory
process as hampering private markets, discouraging innovation, and inhibiting
consumer choice.93 The administration abandoned rules for tasks such as
tracking adverse drug reactions and defective medical devices.94 It also limited
the authority of regulatory agencies and pushed for faster drug approval.95 In the
ten years that followed, pharmaceutical regulatory policies aimed to cut
“bureaucratic red tape” in drug approvals, permit drug companies to market their

88. Olivier J. Wouters, Lobbying Expenditures and Campaign Contributions by the Pharmaceutical and
Health Product Industry in the United States, 1999-2018, 180 JAMA INTERN MED., 688, 688 (2020); After
Purdue Pharma faced charges for its advertising its opioids in 2007, it hired lobbyists to fight any legislative
actions that might encroach on its business. Between 2006 and 2015, Purdue and other painkiller producers,
along with their associated nonprofits, spent nearly 900 million dollars on lobbying and political contributions—
eight times what the gun lobby spent during the same time. O’Keefe, supra note 78.
89. Top Industries: All Years (1998-2020), CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLS., https://www.opensecrets.org/
federal-lobbying/industries?cycle=2020 (last visited Jan. 24, 2022).
90. Id.; Chris McGreal, How Big Pharma’s Money — And Its Politicians — Feed the US Opioid Crisis,
THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/oct/19/big-pharma-moneylobbying-us-opioid-crisis.
91. Margaret A. Hamburg, Shattuck Lecture. Innovation, Regulation, and the FDA, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED.
2228, 2228 (2010).
92. KEITH WAILOO, PAIN: A POLITICAL HISTORY 172–73 (2014).
93. Id. In his article, Eugene McCarthy describes the “long and arduous process” of obtaining FDA
approval to bring a drug to market. See Eugene McCarthy, The Pharma Barons: Corporate Law’s Dangerous
New Race to the Bottom in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 8 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 29, 47
(2018). This process requires first identifying a potential therapeutic use for the drug and then engaging in
multiple clinical trials to test the drug’s safety and effectiveness. Id. Taking a new drug from development to
market could take up to ten years or longer, with the FDA approval process alone taking at least six to twelve
months. See PHRMA, BIOPHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT: THE PROCESS BEHIND NEW
MEDICINES (2015), http://phrma-docs.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/rd_brochure_022307.pdf. Drug
development is also expensive, costing an estimated $2.6 billion per drug. Id. Clinical trials alone cost a median
$19 million, with larger trials costing $135 million. Thomas Moore, Hanzhe Zhang, Gerard Anderson & G.
Caleb Alexander, Estimated Costs of Pivotal Trials for Novel Therapeutic Agents Approved by the US Food and
Drug Administration, 2015-2016, 178 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1451, 1454 (2018).
94. WAILOO, supra note 92, at 172–73.
95. Id. at 173.
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drugs direct-to-consumers (“DTC”),96 and speed the flow of products from drug
maker to consumer took hold.97
The pharmaceutical industry’s deregulation was followed by the FDA’s
systematic failure to exercise the authority it had retained. Specifically, at least
one scholar has argued that the FDA failed to curtail the opioid epidemic in three
ways.98 First, the FDA failed to police false marketing claims by opioid
manufacturers. For example, the FDA allowed Purdue Pharma to mislabel its
opioids in a manner that suggested that they were indicated for a broader range
of conditions than supported by medical evidence.99 Second, the FDA did not
require sufficient and well-controlled clinical trials for opioids.100 This
contravened the FDA’s general requirement of at least two randomized,
controlled trials demonstrating clear efficacy for a drug’s proposed indication.101
Purdue and other opioid manufacturers lobbied for a new kind of clinical trial
that utilized so-called “enriched enrollment” protocols that permitted opioid
manufacturers to engage in clinical bias.102 These protocols allowed researchers
conducting the clinical trial to remove patients from the study who were not
responding well to the opioid treatment.103 As a result, if the drug was failing
the clinical trial, the researchers would remove the subjects who showed that it
was failing and continue the trial without them.104 Ultimately the FDA approved
Purdue’s extended-release OxyContin in 1995 based on only one study, a two-

96. The Food and Drug Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA) ended the long-standing restriction on DTC
prescription drug advertising. See Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 § 421, 21 U.S.C.
§ 331(l); Draft Guidance for Industry, Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisements, Availability, 62 Fed. Reg.
43171, 43172 (Aug. 12, 1997). The United States is the only nation that affirmatively authorizes drug companies
to advertise prescription drugs directly to the public. See Amanda L. Connors, Note, Big Bad Pharma: An Ethical
Analysis of Physician-Directed and Consumer-Directed Marketing Tactics, 73 ALB. L. REV. 243, 244, 267
(2009). New Zealand also allows drug companies to engage in DTC prescription drug advertising, but in New
Zealand this legal outcome appears to be the result of a legislative oversight. See Susanna Every-Palmer, Rishi
Duggal & David B. Menkes, Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Medication in New Zealand,
127 N. Z. MED. J. 102, 103 (2014).
97. WAILOO, supra note 92, at 172–73.
98. Andrew Kolodny, How FDA Failures Contributed to the Opioid Crisis, 22 AM. MED. ASS’N J.
ETHICS 743, 743 (2020). Kolodny maintains that drug companies have yet to conduct successful clinical trials
that prove the safety and efficacy of their opioids for treating chronic pain. Andrew Kolodny, David T.
Courtwright, Catherine S. Hwang, Peter Kreiner, John L. Eadie, Thomas W. Clark & G. Caleb Alexander, The
Prescription Opioid and Heroin Crisis: A Public Health Approach to an Epidemic of Addiction, 36 ANN. REV.
PUB. HEALTH 559, 562–63 (2015).
99. How FDA Failures Contributed to the Opioid Crisis, supra note 98, at 744–45.
100. Id. at 745.
101. Nicholas S. Downing, Jenerius A. Aminawung, Nilay D. Shah, Harlan M. Krumholz & Joseph S. Ross,
Clinical Trial Evidence Supporting FDA Approval of Novel Therapeutic Agents, 2005-2012, 311 JAMA 368,
369 (2014).
102. Martha Rosenberg, What Big Pharma Doesn’t Want You to Know about the Opioid Epidemic, SALON
(June 3, 2016, 8:15 AM), https://www.salon.com/2016/06/03/what_big_pharma_doesnt_want_you_to_know_
about_the_opioid_epidemic_partner.
103. LEMBKE, supra note 21, at 68–69.
104. How FDA Failures Contributed to the Opioid Crisis, supra note 98, at 745.
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week clinical trial.105 When the FDA approved OxyContin for treating moderate
to severe pain, Purdue had conducted no clinical studies on its addictive
potential.106 The FDA also approved a package insert for OxyContin that
claimed the drug was safer than rival painkillers.107
Finally, the FDA has not managed conflicts of interest between agency
staff and the industry. A revolving door has existed between the FDA and
pharmaceutical manufacturers for the last twenty years. Agency officials and
staffers responsible for drug approvals, opioid oversight, and opioid
manufacturing routinely leave the FDA to work for opioid makers or private
industry consultants.108 In 2020, more than sixty-three percent (955 of 1,502) of
registered pharmaceutical industry lobbyists disclosed that they were once
federal officials.109 Senior FDA officials are typically industry insiders or have
strong financial ties to drug companies.110 It appears that many government
regulators bide their time before departing for more lucrative opportunities in
the pharmaceutical industry, which experts agree compromises their regulatory
decisions.111 For example, the FDA examiner who oversaw OxyContin’s
approval process left the agency shortly after the drug was approved.112 Within
two years, he had taken a job at Purdue Pharma.113
3. Industry’s Influence on the Prescribers and the Public Through
Marketing and Advertising
Simultaneous with the pharmaceutical industry’s efforts to control drug
research, influence governmental actors, and encourage a new approach to the
treatment of pain, pharmaceutical companies also engaged in aggressive
marketing to prescribers and the public, which affected prescribing practices and
laid the groundwork for the opioid epidemic that followed. Purdue Pharma and

105. Id.; see also CTR. FOR DRUG EVAL. & RSCH., APPROVAL PACKAGE FOR OXYCODONE HYDROCHLORIDE
CONTROLLED RELEASE TABLETS (July 8, 1996), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/96/
020553s002.pdf (describing the clinical trial conducted for the 80 mg. OxyContin time-released tablet).
106. O’Keefe, supra note 78.
107. Id.
108. How FDA Failures Contributed to the Opioid Crisis, supra note 98, at 746; see Charles Pillar, FDA’s
Revolving Door: Companies Often Hire Agency Staffers Who Managed Their Successful Drug Reviews, SCI.
MAG. (July 5, 2018), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/07/fda-s-revolving-door-companies-often-hireagency-staffers-who-managed-their-successful (describing how FDA staffers who review applications for drug
approvals, and present evidence to the agency’s advisory panels are free to move to jobs in pharma or consulting
with drug companies, and documenting that many former FDA staffers transition to the industry less than a year
after working on a company’s application).
109. Industry
Profile:
Pharmaceuticals/Health
Products,
2020,
OPENSECRETS,
https://www.opensecrets.org/federal-lobbying/industries/lobbyists?cycle=2020&id=h04 (last visited Jan. 24,
2022).
110. McCarthy, supra note 93, at 59.
111. FRAN HAWTHORNE, INSIDE THE FDA: THE BUSINESS AND POLITICS BEHIND THE DRUGS WE TAKE AND
THE FOOD WE EAT 150 (2005).
112. O’Keefe, supra note 78.
113. Id.
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its owners, the Sackler family, laid the cornerstone for that the marketing
structure.
In the early 1950s, Arthur Sackler, a psychiatrist by training, was employed
by a small medical advertising firm in New York.114 Working with the drug
maker Pfizer, Sackler developed a novel advertising method to market a Pfizer
antibiotic directly to doctors by purchasing multiple advertisements in medical
journals, direct-mail marketing, and sending Pfizer sales representatives to visit
doctors’ offices.115 This advertising blitz resulted in record-breaking sales of
Pfizer’s antibiotic.116 Through his efforts, Sackler invented modern
pharmaceutical marketing, a field of advertising which did not previously
exist.117 Sackler ultimately bought the advertising firm that had employed him,
and a few years later, he and his brothers bought an unknown drug company,
Purdue Fredrick.118
In the early 1960s, Sackler’s advertising firm partnered with the drug firm
Hoffman-La Roche to sell a new tranquilizer, Valium.119 Sackler turned the
successful marketing strategies that he had developed on the Pfizer campaign to
the promotion of Valium. He promoted it to doctors, who at the time viewed the
drug with suspicion because of its potential for addiction.120 But Sackler’s
relentless marketing techniques based on building personal connections between
salespeople and doctors helped to reframe the narrative of Valium as a safe and
legitimate remedy for stress and anxiety.121 By the end of the 1960s, as the result
of Sackler’s advertising approach, Valium became the pharmaceutical industry’s
first billion-dollar drug.122 He also used his influence with other drug companies
to fund and sponsor continuing education programs for the medical community,
as well as publish an industry-friendly biweekly newspaper for doctors.123
In the early 1980s, the Sacklers’ drug firm, by then renamed Purdue
Pharma, developed a pain management drug, which they marketed as MS
Contin—a new formulation of oxycodone that featured a timed-release formula
to send high doses of morphine directly into a patient’s bloodstream
continuously over several hours.124 At the time it was released, Purdue marketed
MS Contin only for cancer patients, post-surgical hospital patients, and end-oflife palliative care.125 In the mid-1990s, Purdue repackaged MS Contin into

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

SAM QUINONES, DREAMLAND 28–30 (2015).
Id.
Id.
O’Keefe, supra, note 78.
Warren & Rogers, supra note 118.
O’Keefe, supra note 78.
Id.; QUINONES, supra note 114, at 30.
QUINONES, supra note 114, at 30.
Id.
Id.; O’Keefe, supra note 78.
O’Keefe, supra note 78.
Id.

320

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 73:2

OxyContin, which featured a reformulated time-released coating.126 In the
decade between the release of MS Contin and OxyContin, as discussed in Part
I.B.1. and I.B.2., the drug regulatory environment, the political climate, and the
medical communities’ perception of pain—had changed dramatically. By the
1990s, OxyContin could be directly marketed to doctors and the public.127 The
Sacklers’ aggressive marketing and advertising efforts for the drug arrived in a
marketplace of doctors and consumers eager to deploy OxyContin to treat all
forms of pain. A tsunami of opioid prescriptions followed. From 1997 to 2002,
the annual number of prescriptions for OxyContin alone increased from 670,000
to 6.2 million, reaching a total number of prescriptions of 45 million.128
To be sure, Purdue did not act alone in causing the opioid epidemic. Other
pharmaceutical companies also contributed through similar advertising
practices, such as advocating to medical professionals and direct-to-consumer
(DTC) marketing efforts about the beneficial use of their drugs as safe palliative
care for chronic pain.129 Although pharmaceutical companies have asserted that
DTC drug advertising is designed to inform and educate the public, “the primary
purpose of DTC advertising is not to educate consumers, but instead is to
encourage them to actively seek out medication that their physician would not
otherwise prescribe.”130 DTC marketing has proven profitable because studies
show that doctors prescribe the drugs that patients request approximately 75%
of the time.131 Consequently, DTC advertisements have earned drug companies
more than four dollars in profit for every one dollar they invest in DTC
prescription drug advertising.132 As a result, drug companies have consistently
spent twice as much money on marketing than research and development.133
The Food and Drug Modernization Act of 1997 (“FDAMA”) also instituted
changes that permitted drug company representatives to influence doctor’s
prescribing practices in other ways. The FDAMA allows companies to engage
in off-label “detailing” to doctors,134 which is the practice of persuading doctors
126. Id. OxyContin differed from MS Contin only to the extent that OxyContin featured as new slow-release
delivery mechanism in the form of a digestible coating which purportedly slowed the absorption of the drug over
the course of several hours and thus allowed for steady pain and long-lasting pain relief. Thus, Purdue touted it
as having less potential for addiction and abuse than other formulations of opioids because of its coating. MACY,
supra note 21, at 315 (2018).
127. O’Keefe, supra note 78.
128. Jones et al., supra note 65, at 16.
129. David C. Vladeck, The Difficult Case of Direct-To-Consumer Drug Advertising, 41 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 259, 286 (2007).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 270.
132. See Hannah Brennan, The Cost of Confusion: The Paradox of Trademarked Pharmaceuticals,
22 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 1, 27 (2015).
133. Stephanie M. Greene, After Caronia: First Amendment Concerns in Off Label Promotion, 51 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 645, 696 (2014) (discussing various concerns about off-label prescription drug use including
undisclosed side effects).
134. See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Draft Guidance for Industry: Good Reprint Practices for the
Distribution of Medical Journal Articles and Medical or Scientific Reference Publications on Unapproved New
Uses of Approved Drugs and Approved or Cleared Medical Devices, 73 Fed. Reg. 9342, 9342 (Feb. 20, 2008).
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to prescribe drugs to patients for uses that the FDA has not approved.135 To
persuade doctors to overlook the lack of FDA approval, sales representatives
presented doctors with journal articles—which the drug company paid for—
about a drug’s effectiveness to treat a particular ailment for which the drug has
not been approved.136 Detailing has also proven an effective marketing tactic, as
20% of all prescriptions that doctors write are for off-label uses.137
Beyond detailing, it is estimated that pharmaceutical companies spend five
billion dollars annually on gifts to physicians and medical students to promote
their products.138 Company sales representatives provide physicians with
everything from pens, lanyards, and notepads to meals, tickets to entertainment
and sporting events, and weekend-long getaway vacations.139 One 2007 study
from the New England Journal of Medicine found that of 3,000 physicians, 83%
of physicians accepted food or drink from pharmaceutical companies, 78%
accepted drug samples, 35% accepted reimbursement for meeting expenses,
28% accepted money for lectures, and 7% accepted free tickets.140
Pharmaceutical companies’ gifts noticeably impact doctors’ prescribing
practices. One study found that physicians prescribe drugs in which they
attended paid conferences 4.5 to 10 times more often than other drugs.141
Another study, which combined data from 538 similar studies, concluded that
the current “extent of physician-industry interactions appears to affect the
prescribing and professional behavior” of physicians.142 For example, it found
that the recipient physician of free drug samples was associated with “preference
and rapid prescription of a new drug and a positive attitude towards the
135. Puneet Manchanda & Elisabeth Honka, Pharmaceutical Innovation and Cost: An American Dilemma:
The Effects and Role of Direct-to-Physician Marketing in the Pharmaceutical Industry: An Integrative Review,
5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 785, 785 (2005). Doctors may prescribe any drug they deem medically
necessary, even if the FDA has not approved that drug to treat a particular condition. Marc A. Rodwin, Rooting
Out Institutional Corruption to Manage Inappropriate Off-Label Drug Use, 41 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 654, 654
(2013).
136. Rodwin, supra note 135, at 657.
137. Stephanie M. Greene & Lars Noah, Debate, Off-Label Drug Promotion and the First Amendment, 162
U. PA. L. REV. 239, 241 (2014). In fact, in many patient populations, off-label prescriptions constitute the bulk
of treatment. Rodwin, supra note 135, at 656. Up to 75% of cancer drugs, 80% of pediatric drugs, and 90% of
prescription drugs for rare diseases are off label. Id. As a result, drug companies earn billions of dollars each
year from the sale of off-label prescription drugs. This calculation is based on the estimate that 2017 global
pharmaceutical sales are expected to top $1.2 trillion. See Craig W. Lindsley, New 2016 Data and Statistics for
Global Pharmaceutical Products and Projections through 2017, 8 ACS CHEM. NEUROSCI. 1635, 1635 (2017).
Twenty percent—the percentage of off-label prescription sales—would amount to $240 billion. See id. These
numbers are alarming given that “more than 70 percent of off-label uses lack significant scientific support.”
Rodwin, supra note 135, at 658.
138. Ashley Wazana, Physicians and the Pharmaceutical Industry: Is a Gift Ever Just a Gift?,
283 JAMA 373, 373 (2009).
139. Amanda L. Conners, Comment, Big Bad Pharma: An Ethical Analysis of Physician-Directed and
Consumer-Directed Marketing Tactics, 73 ALB. L. REV. 243, 251 (2010).
140. Sheena T. Wheeler, Note, Under the Influence: An Examination of the Tactics Pharmaceutical
Companies Use to Manipulate Physicians, 7 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 89, 90 (2010).
141. Id. at 105.
142. Wazana, supra note 138, at 373.
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pharmaceutical representative.”143 From these studies, it is clear that physicians
prescribing practices have attributed to the opioid epidemic, albeit
subconsciously. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, medical professionals
deferred to the messaging of pharmaceutical representatives on the efficacy and
safety of opioids. Prescribers did not question the lack of evidence, including the
mischaracterization of Porter and Jick, because they lacked training and medical
education in pain management sufficient to critique the evidence.144
The absence of a functioning regulatory environment within which the
pharmaceutical industry operated during the 1980s, coupled with the general
decrease in publicly funded drug research, meant that there were fewer
government watchdogs, a dearth of scientific studies, and fewer scientific voices
to countervail the efforts of the industry to market opioids to clinicians and the
public. The absence of government oversight and funding resulted in a lack of
meaningful critique of the evidence the pharmaceutical industry presented to
demonstrate the efficacy and safety of the opioids developed during this time.
As a result, the aggressive marketing to doctors and consumers remained
effective in boosting drug sales well into the 2000s.145
Insys Therapeutics’ marketing of Subsys to doctors is illustrative of the
typical sales practices prevalent in the industry. Insys Therapeutics’ sales
representatives, among other things, targeted doctors who prescribed at higher
rates.146 They also encouraged doctors to give patients free Subsys while
awaiting approval from their insurance companies.147 The Insys former head of
sales admitted that when deciding which doctors to work with, he “[assessed]
whether they had a killer instinct, almost no conscience”148 and if they were
willing to prescribe Subsys at unnecessarily high doses—“label, off-label,
143. Id. Pharmaceutical representatives are trained to make physicians feel obligated to prescribe their
brand’s product. They will strengthen their relationship with medical professionals through passive tactics by
inciting feelings of social tension between themselves and the physician. For example, in one case a
pharmaceutical representative would bring coffee to the office every Tuesday without being asked. She would
then insist that if the physician did not write two prescriptions for her brand that day, she would no longer bring
coffee to the office. See Conners, supra note 139, at 263. The physician testified that this made his office feel
pressure to prescribe her brand’s product, despite not ever having asked for the coffee. He claimed the
representative had access to the physician’s prescribing patterns and therefore could see how many written
prescriptions were for her brand or for the competitor. Id. A study done by the University of Washington in 2000
examined the effect of free drug samples on physician prescribing practices. The study found that when there is
a presence of free drug samples, physicians were influenced to prescribe drugs that differ from their preferred
drug choice. See Wheeler, supra note 140, at 110.
144. Sarah Deweerdt, The Natural History of an Epidemic, 573 NATURE S10, S11 (2019).
145. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO-04-110, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: OXYCONTIN ABUSE AND DIVERSION AND
EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM (2003). Purdue’s sales of OxyContin escalated from $44 million (316,000
prescriptions dispensed) in 1996 to a 2001 and 2002 combined sales of nearly $3 billion (over 14 million
prescriptions). Id. at 31.
146. See Memorandum and Order on Defendants’ Motions for Judgment of Acquittal and for a New Trial
at 1, U.S. v. Babich, No. 1:16-cr-10343-ADB (D. Mass. 2016).
147. Id. at 5.
148. Hannah Kuchler, Nicky Verbitsky, Tom Jennings & Shaunagh Connaire, Insys Executives Are
Sentenced to Prison Time, Putting Opioid Makers on Notice, PBS: FRONTLINE (Jan. 23, 2020),
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/opioid-maker-insys-executives-sentenced-prison-subsys.
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nobody cares.” 149 One sales representative also testified that she and her boss
performed lap dances for a doctor to encourage him to prescribe Subsys.150
Other sales representatives reported that their bonuses increased if they could
convince doctors to prescribe higher doses of Subsys, and executives
encouraged knowing that addicted patients refilled their prescriptions more
often.151
A straight line can be drawn from the sales techniques Insys Therapeutics
employed to Purdue Pharma’s practices in marketing OxyContin. The
convergence of pharmaceutical companies like Purdue and Insys Therapeutics’
aggressive marketing practices, their dominance of opioid research, influence on
the perception of pain, and their efforts to manipulate government actors account
for the explosive increase of opioid prescriptions and abuse in the last three
decades. These factors may also help explain why, at least in part, the
government has failed to prosecute individual drug company executives after it
uncovers their fraud. However, the question remains: why has the crisis occurred
despite the CSA and other laws implemented to prevent its existence? Finding
the answer to this question begins with a closer examination of the current law
and the existing ethical framework governing the pharmaceutical industry.
II. THE STATE OF THE LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS
No single federal law exists to prosecute pharmaceutical companies and
their executives for causing the opioid epidemic. Although most of the statutes
used to regulate pharmaceutical companies allow some form of criminal
liability, historically, it has been rare for the government to prosecute
pharmaceutical companies and corporate executives.152 Even when prosecutors
have brought charges, those cases have not proven to be an effective deterrent
for future bad conduct, nor have they halted the opioid epidemic. Therefore,
scholars and policymakers have offered other solutions to impose criminal
culpability on the pharmaceutical industry and corporate actors, such as using
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)153 or new
legislation such OCAA.154 This Part discusses the current state of the law,
analyzes its shortcomings, and critiques the other solutions that have been
offered thus far.
A. THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORKS AND ETHICAL NORMS APPLIED TO

149. Id.
150. Gabrielle Emanuel & Katie Thomas, Opioid Company Executives Convicted of Racketeering, N.Y.
TIMES, May 3, 2019, at B1.
151. Id.
152. Almashat et al., supra note 5, at 24.
153. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968.
154. Opioid Crisis Accountability Act of 2019, H.R. 2917 116th Cong. Preamble, § 1 (2019).
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THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY

This Subpart describes current federal155 laws that govern the industry, and
notable prosecutions of pharmaceutical companies and executives for
misconduct in manufacturing, marketing, and distributing opioids are reviewed.
Ethical standards designed to shape industry behavior are also considered.
1. Federal Laws and Regulatory Mechanisms
Pharmaceutical companies are currently regulated piecemeal under several
federal laws that target specific industry practices. The most common of these
laws are (1) FDCA, (2) FCA, and (3) CSA.156 The application of these laws and
notable pharmaceutical industry cases are discussed in turn.
a. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)
The FDCA, originally enacted in 1938, empowers the FDA to regulate the
safety of food, drugs, and cosmetics.157 The FDCA and its regulations contain
pharmaceutical companies’ requirements to test, produce, and market their
drugs.158 It specifically prohibits the manufacture and introduction into interstate
commerce of a drug that is “adulterated or misbranded.”159 A drug is
“misbranded” under the FDCA if a false or misleading representation is made
about some aspect of the drug’s nature.160
A violation of the FDCA may be charged as a misdemeanor, subject to
strict liability, resulting in a fine of $1,000, one year of imprisonment, or both.161
Those that violate the act knowingly or repeatedly are subject to felony
prosecution under the act and face a term of imprisonment of ten years, a fine of
$250,000, or both.162 Further, dissemination of “direct-to-consumer
155. This Article focuses on prosecuting pharmaceutical companies and their executives under federal law.
Most pharmaceutical companies manufacture and distribute opioids on national rather than state or local level.
As described in note 5, infra, nearly every state has filed litigation against pharmaceutical companies based on
their false marketing and labeling practices under states’ False Claim Acts, common law fraud or unfair trade
laws and many have joined the MDL. See Almashat et al., supra note 5, at 56. See State v. Abbott Labs, Inc.,
208 So. 3d 384 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2016), writ denied, 216 So. 3d 802, and writ denied, 216 So. 3d 808, and
overruled by State, by & through Caldwell v. Astra Zeneca AB, 249 So. 3d 38 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2018) (alleging
fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and unlawful marketing practices); Com. v. TAP Pharm. Prod., Inc., 626 Pa.
1 (94 A.3d 350 2014) (alleging unfair trade practices, fraud, civil conspiracy, negligent misrepresentation); Watts
v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 239 Ariz. 19, 23 (2016) (alleging tort and product liability); see also MDL 2804,
National Prescription Opiate Litigation, United States District Court, Northern District of Ohio,
https://www.ohnd.uscourts.gov/mdl-2804. A thorough review of the MDL and other state civil and criminal
ligation against pharmaceutical companies is beyond the scope of this Article.
156. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–803.
157. 21 C.F.R. § 1.1 (2010).
158. Eugene McCarthy, A Call to Prosecute Drug Company Fraud as Organized Crime, 69 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 439, 444 (2019).
159. 21 U.S.C. § 331(a); 21 U.S.C. § 331(g).
160. United States v. Torigian Labs, Inc., 577 F. Supp. 1514, 1525 (E.D.N.Y.), aff’d sub nom. United States
v. Torigian Labs., 751 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1984).
161. 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(1).
162. Id. § 333(b)(1).
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advertisement that is false or misleading may result in a civil penalty of $250,000
for the first such violation in any 3-year period.”163
Because the intent of individual actors in a corporation is difficult to prove,
a violation of the FDCA is not frequently charged as a felony.164 Corporate
officers may, however, face misdemeanor prosecution under the strict liability
portions of the FDCA under the “responsible corporate officer doctrine.” In
United States v. Dotterweich, the Supreme Court recognized that a corporate
officer might be held individually liable for violating the FDCA.165 The Supreme
Court explained that the strict liability scheme of the FDCA is justified because
individual consumers are not well-situated to protect themselves from
adulterated or misbranded food and drugs while businesses are.166 Thus,
businesses may be held liable for any risks they create by choosing to operate in
those fields.167 After that, in United States v. Park, the Supreme Court held that
a corporate officer could be held liable for a company’s violation of the FDCA
without any personal “awareness of some wrongdoing” if the officer had the
authority to prevent a violation and failed to do so.168
Despite the availability of the responsible corporate officer doctrine,
prosecutors have not frequently prosecuted corporate officers unless there is at
least evidence of the officer’s negligence.169 For example, in 2007, in a case
brought by federal prosecutors in Virginia, Purdue Pharma and three executives
were convicted of FDCA misbranding violations.170 The defendants
acknowledged that Purdue had marketed OxyContin with the intent to defraud
or mislead.171 Purdue pleaded guilty to felony charges and paid more than $600
million in fines.172 Michael Friedman, the executive vice-president, along with
Howard Udell and Purdue Pharma’s chief medical officer Paul Goldenheim,

163. Id. § 333(g)(1).
164. Ty McCoy, The Need for Higher Punishment: Lock Up the Real Drug Dealers, 54 GONZ. L. REV. 47,
69 (2019).
165. See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 279 (1943).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672 (1975).
169. Marc A. Rodwin, Do We Need Stronger Sanctions to Ensure Legal Compliance by Pharmaceutical
Firms?, 70 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 435, 440 (2015). The majority opinion in Park did not specifically establish a
standard of negligence, other than to state that “the [FDCA] punishes neglect where the law requires care.” Park,
421 U.S. at 658–59. The Park dissent, however, specified a negligence standard more specifically. Park, 421
U.S. at 679 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Since then, many courts have followed the dissent’s interpretation and have
required cases brought pursuant to Park to establish negligence on the part of the corporate officer. See United
States v. DeCoster, 828 F.3d 626, 633 (8th Cir. 2016), aff’d, 137 S. Ct. 2160 (2017); United States v. New
England Grocers Supply Co., 488 F. Supp. 230, 233 (D. Mass. 1980); United States v. Ayo-Gonzalez, 536 F.2d
652, 661–62 (5th Cir. 1976).
170. United States v. Purdue Frederick Co., 495 F. Supp. 2d 569, 572 (W.D. Va. 2007); Barry Meier, In
Guilty Plea, OxyContin Maker to Pay $600 Million, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2007, at A1.
171. Meier, supra note 170, at A1.
172. Id.
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pleaded guilty to misdemeanors and were sentenced to fines, probation, and
community service.173
However, the 2007 FDCA convictions of Purdue Pharma and its executives
did not serve to deter the company’s misconduct. They continued to aggressively
market opioids, and prescriptions increased.174 In 2020, Purdue Pharma once
again pled guilty to violating the FDCA.175 As part of the guilty plea, Purdue
admitted that from May 2007 through at least March 2017, it conspired to
defraud the United States by impeding the lawful function of the DEA, including
representing that Purdue maintained an effective anti-diversion program when,
in fact, Purdue continued to market its opioid products to health care providers
whom the company had good reason to believe were diverting opioids.176 Purdue
also reported misleading information to the DEA to boost its manufacturing
quotas.177 The conspiracy also involved aiding and abetting violations of the
FDCA by facilitating the dispensing of its opioid products, including
OxyContin, without a legitimate medical purpose.178 Under the terms of the plea
agreement, Purdue agreed to the imposition of the largest penalties ever levied
against a pharmaceutical manufacturer, including a fine of $3.544 billion and an
additional $2 billion in criminal forfeiture.179 However, no individual corporate
owner or executive was charged in connection with the case.180
b. False Claims Act (FCA)
A False Claims Act violation can be charged as a criminal or civil offense.
The criminal violation, codified in 18 U.S.C. § 287, criminalizes the intentional
presentation of a false claim to a government actor knowing such claim to be
false, and it imposes a five-year prison term and a fine.181 The civil FCA,
codified in 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 is likewise not specific to the regulation of
the pharmaceutical industry.182 However, claims against pharmaceutical
companies are often brought under the civil FCA for “misbranding and
mislabeling products, promoting products for off-label or non-FDA approved
uses, misrepresenting or adulterating data and clinical trial results, and failing to

173. See Purdue Frederick Co., 495 F. Supp. 2d at 570.
174. Guy et al., supra note 66, at 698–99. According to the CDC, annual opioid prescribing rates increased
from 72.4 to 81.2 prescriptions per 100 persons from 2006 to 2010 and remained constant through 2012. They
began decreasing in 2012 and have since decreased to 70.6 per 100 persons in 2015. Id.
175. Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Opioid Manufacturer Purdue Pharma Pleads Guilty to Fraud and
Kickback Conspiracies (Nov. 24, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/opioid-manufacturer-purdue-pharmapleads-guilty-fraud-and-kickback-conspiracies.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. 18 U.S.C. § 287.
182. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733.
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disclose or adequately warn consumers of potential risks and side effects.”183
The FCA provides that any person who knowingly presents false claims to the
government is liable for a civil penalty of $5,000 to $10,000 and three times the
amount of damages sustained by the government.184
In a civil FCA action, the named plaintiff is the United States
government.185 The FCA also contains a qui tam provision, awarding 15–25%
of the proceeds of the action to a whistleblower who brings a violation to the
government’s attention.186 An analysis of pharmaceutical civil penalties from
1991 to 2017 found that qui tam actions represented most claims against
pharmaceutical companies.187
The criminal FCA provision, Section 287, has not been used to prosecute
pharmaceutical companies. However, the government has brought charges
against drug companies under the civil FCA, Section 3729.188. Although both
sections require proof of the defendant’s “knowledge,” Section 287 has been
interpreted to require actual knowledge of wrongdoing,189 while Section 3729
provides that knowledge can be shown through proof of “actual knowledge of
the information, deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information;
or acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information.”190
Notably, in late 2020, in addition to the criminal charges brought against
it under the FDCA, Purdue Pharma settled FCA civil claims against it for $3
billion based on its marketing and selling of opioids purchased by Medicare and
other federal health care providers.191 Although the deal also required the
Sacklers to pay $225 million, none of the corporate executives faced criminal
liability under the FCA.192

183. Annastasia Moriarty, Avoiding Accountability: The Insulation of Pharmaceutical Companies from
Criminal Liability, SUFFOLK J. OF HEALTH & BIOMED. L. BLOG (Feb. 26, 2020), https://sites.suffolk.edu/jhbl/
2020/02/26/avoiding-accountability-the-insulation-of-pharmaceutical-companies-from-criminal-liability.
184. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a).
185. Stephanie Greene, False Claims Act Liability for Off-Label Promotion of Pharmaceutical Products,
110 PENN ST. L. REV. 41, 54 (2005).
186. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d). A qui tam is a provision which allows a private individual, or “whistleblower”
(or relator), with knowledge of past or present fraud committed against the federal government to bring suit on
its behalf. Qui Tam Action, LEGAL INFO. INST.: CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/
qui_tam_action (last visited Jan. 24, 2022); Greene, supra note 185, at 54–55.
187. Almashat et al., supra note 5, at 10.
188. 31 U.S.C. § 3729.
189. Under the criminal FCA, 18 U.S.C. § 287, to be false, the claim must not only be inaccurate but
consciously so. United States v. Barker, 967 F.2d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1991). See United States. v. Coop. Grain
& Supply Co., 476 F.2d 47, 59 (8th Cir. 1973) (comparing the intent elements of civil FCA and criminal FCA
violations, recognizing the heightened scienter requirement in section 287, and suggesting that “knowing” under
section 287 implied actual guilty knowledge rather than a “guilty avoidance of knowledge”).
190. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1).
191. Dep’t of Just., supra note 175.
192. Id.
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c. Controlled Substances Act (CSA)
The CSA provides the Attorney General, FDA, and DEA with broad
authority to regulate various drugs.193 As the primary federal law regulating
controlled substances, the CSA categorizes drugs, including prescription
narcotics and opioids, into five schedules (I-V) based on their potential for abuse
and addiction, their acceptance for medical applications, and their safety.194 The
drugs listed in Schedule I are considered the most dangerous and are deemed
illegal under all circumstances because they have a high potential for abuse, lack
accepted safety for use even under medical supervision, and have no currently
accepted medical use in treatment in the United States.195 The drugs in Schedules
II-V also have the potential for abuse but have medical uses in treatment in the
United States or a currently accepted medical use with severe restrictions.196 The
class of drugs listed in Schedule II includes commonly prescribed opioid drugs
such as morphine, methadone, oxycodone, and injectable forms of
methamphetamine that have been used to treat chronic and acute pain.197
Schedule II drugs have been most closely associated with abuse in the opioid
epidemic.198 The fact that prescription opioids have been placed on Schedule II
reflects a finding that they have an accepted medical use but pose a high potential
for abuse, and such abuse may lead to severe psychological or physical
dependence.199
Because some controlled substances, such as opioids, have legitimate
medical uses, the CSA creates two overlapping legal schemes: “(1) a registration
system to monitor and control the flow of controlled substances dispensed under
legitimate prescriptions, and (2) a set of penalties for illegitimate trafficking and
possession of controlled substances.”200 To legally sell opioids, drug
manufacturers and distributors must register annually with the Attorney

193. Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar & Keith Humphreys, The Political Economy of the Opioid Epidemic,
38 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 20 (2019); 21 U.S.C. § 811(a).
194. Controlled Substance Schedules, DRUG ENF’T AGENCY, https://www.dea.gov/drug-information/drugscheduling.
195. Waldrop, supra note 43, at 890. Schedule I drugs include heroin (diacetylmorphine), LSD (Lysergic
acid
diethylamide),
marijuana
(cannabis,
THC),
Mescaline
(Peyote),
MDMA
(3,4methylenedioxymethamphetamine or “ecstasy”), GHB (gamma-hydroxybutyric acid), ecstasy (MDMA or 3,4
methylenedioxymethamphetamine), Psilocybin, synthetic marijuana and analogs (spice, K2), Methaqualone
(quaalude), Khat (Cathinone), and bath salts (3,4-methylenedioxypyrovalerone or MDPV). See , DRUG ENF’T
AGENCY, CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES BY CSA SCHEDULE (2021), https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/
schedules/orangebook/e_cs_sched.pdf; Controlled Substance Schedules, supra note 194.
196. Controlled Substance Schedules, supra note 194.
197. Id.
198. See 21 C.F.R. § 1308.12 (2019); Marsh L. Meldrum, A Capsule History of Pain Management,
290 JAMA 2470, 2474 (2003). Schedule II drugs include common opioid painkillers such as morphine, opium,
codeine, hydrocodone, hydromorphone, methadone, meperidine, oxycodone, and fentanyl. See Controlled
Substance Schedules, supra note 194.
199. Controlled Substance Schedules, supra note 194.
200. JOANNA R. LAMPE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10307, CORPORATE DRUG TRAFFICKING LIABILITY—A
NEW LEGAL FRONT IN THE OPIOID CRISIS (2019).
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General.201 Registrants must adhere to the CSA’s requirements regarding,
among other things, distribution, labeling, and warning of opioids.202 Violations
of the registration requirements are not generally considered criminal offenses
unless they were committed knowingly, in which case, a registrant could be
subject to a fine or imprisonment for up to one year.203 However, a violation of
the general drug trafficking provision is subject to stricter penalties, such as a
$2.5 million fine and up to fifteen years imprisonment for violations related to
Schedule II drugs.204 Finally, the CSA’s registration system and its trafficking
regime are not mutually exclusive, and participation in the registration system
does not insulate registrants from the statute’s trafficking penalties.205
In April 2019, the DOJ indicted Rochester Drug Cooperative, Inc. (RDC),
the sixth largest drug distributor in the United States, and two of its executives
for CSA violations based on the company’s distribution of oxycodone and
fentanyl to pharmacies.206 The RDC indictments represent the first time the
government brought felony charges against any company in the pharmaceutical
industry under the general drug trafficking provisions of the CSA.207 Previously
when the DOJ brought criminal trafficking charges against CSA registrants, it
targeted individual doctors and pharmacies that improperly prescribed or
dispensed opioids directly to patients. By contrast, prior DEA enforcement
actions against pharmaceutical companies have generally proceeded under the
CSA’s registration provisions, rather than the trafficking provisions, and have
involved only civil and administrative penalties, such as suspension of
registration and fines.208
RDC, however, was charged with felony conspiracy to distribute opioids,
failure to report suspicious drug orders, and conspiracy to defraud the United
States.209 The complaint alleged that between 2012 and 2017, RDC supplied
large quantities of opioids to pharmacies that it knew did not have a legitimate
medical need for the amount supplied.210 The company’s compliance

201. 21 U.S.C. § 822(a).
202. Id. § 825.
203. Id. § 842(c)(2)(A).
204. Id. § 841(E)(i)(b).
205. United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 124 (1975) (holding that physicians registered under the CSA
can be prosecuted under the general drug trafficking provision “when their activities fall outside the usual course
of professional practice”).
206. Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Manhattan U.S. Attorney and DEA Announce Charges Against Rochester
Drug Co-Operative and Two Executives for Unlawfully Distributing Controlled Substances (Apr. 23, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-and-dea-announce-charges-against-rochesterdrug-co-operative-and.
207. Id. Richard Gonzales, Drug Distributor and Former Execs Face First Criminal Charges in Opioid
Crisis, NAT’L. PUB. RADIO (Apr. 23, 2019, 9:43 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/04/23/716571375/drugdistributor-and-former-execs-face-first-criminal-charges-in-opioid-crisis.
208. See LAMPE, supra note 200.
209. Gonzales, supra note 207.
210. See id.; Trial Pleading, United States v. Rochester Drug Co-op., Inc., No. 19 CRIM 290, (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 23, 2019), WL 7667033.
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department repeatedly warned executives that the pharmacies in question
displayed “red flags” such as purchasing only controlled substances and
accepting a high amount of cash from customers.211 Despite the warnings, senior
management allegedly continued to instruct sales personnel to supply the
controlled substances to the pharmacies.212 Another allegation stated that
executives pushed employees to open new pharmacy customer accounts without
conducting due diligence as required by the CSA.213 In 2019, RDC entered into
a five-year Deferred Prosecution Agreement under which it agreed to pay $20
million as forfeiture, report suspicious orders to DEA moving forward, and
acknowledge responsibility for its conduct.214 In exchange, prosecutors agreed
to seek dismissal of the charges against the company after the five-year term
expired.215 The agreement specifically states that it does not apply to “any
individual or entity other than [RDC],”216 meaning that the two executives who
were also charged will still be prosecuted, and if convicted, could face ten years
to life in prison for violations of the CSA’s drug trafficking provisions.217 Since
the charges, the company has also announced it will no longer distribute opioid
medications.218
2. Pharmaceutical Industry Ethics
In addition to complying with the patchwork of federal statutes and
regulations, pharmaceutical companies are also guided by industry ethics. The
industry has two primary sources for ethical guidelines. The FDA provides one
source,219 and the second set of guidelines are provided by the Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), a trade group that represents
pharmaceutical company interests.220

211. See id.
212. See id.
213. Gonzales, supra note 207; Notably, out of 2,000 suspicious orders received, the company reported only
four to the DEA. Id.
214. Gonzales, supra note 207.
215. Deferred Prosecution Agreement Between U.S. Dep’t of Just., U.S. Attorney S.D.N.Y. and Rochester
Drug Co-Operative, Inc., 4 (Apr. 22, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/press-release/file/1156381/
download.
216. Id.
217. Gonzales, supra note 207.
218. Sonia Mogre, Pharmaceutical Distributor Embroiled in Criminal Charges Ceases Opioid Sales, CNN
(Jan. 14, 2020, 7:23 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/14/us/pharmaceutical-company-stops-selling-opioidmedications/index.html.
219. Guidance (Drugs), FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (July 13, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/guidancecompliance-regulatory-information/guidances-drugs.
220. Codes & Guidelines, PHARM. RES. & MFRS. OF AM., https://www.phrma.org/about/codes-andguidelines (last visited Jan. 24, 2022).
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a. FDA Guidelines
The FDA’s website provides guidelines for the industries that it regulates,
including the pharmaceutical industry.221 Guidelines found on the FDA’s
website include, for example, guidance on product labeling and product
descriptions on social media platforms.222 Although the guidelines are
comprehensive and specific, the document states they are expressly
voluntary.223
b. PhRMA Guidelines
PhRMA represents the interests of the pharmaceutical industry; its
members include many large pharmaceutical companies.224 Its priorities are
“explaining the increased complexity and risk of the research and development
process; reinforcing the need for investment in R&D; ensuring broad access to
and appropriate use of medicines, and emphasizing the importance of strong
intellectual property incentives for new medicines.”225 In addition to advocacy
on behalf of the pharmaceutical industry, PhRMA publishes various best
practices for its members,226 including topics related to advertising, interaction
with medical professionals, and principles of conducting clinical trials.227 For
example, the “Code of Interaction with Health Care Professionals” advises that
pharmaceutical representatives “should not provide any entertainment or
recreational items, such as tickets to the theater or sporting events, sporting
equipment . . . .”228 If a company adopts the guidelines, the company executives
must certify the commitment.229 No penalties exist for the failure to comply with
PhRMA’s guidelines.230
B. CRITIQUE OF LAW AND RECENT PROPOSALS
As described in Part II.A, prosecutors have federal laws at their disposal to
bring cases against pharmaceutical companies and their executives for their
221. Search for FDA Guidance Documents, FED. DRUG AGENCY, https://www.fda.gov/regulatoryinformation/search-fda-guidance-documents (last updated Jan. 3, 2022); Guidances (Drugs), FED. DRUG
AGENCY,
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/guidance-compliance-regulatory-information/guidances-drugs
(last
visited Jan. 24, 2022).
222. FED. DRUG AGENCY, supra note 221.
223. FED. DRUG AGENCY, PRODUCT NAME PLACEMENT, SIZE, AND PROMINENCE IN PROMOTIONAL
LABELING AND ADVERTISEMENTS 1 (2017), https://www.fda.gov/media/87202/download.
224. About, PHARM. RES. & MFRS. OF AM., https://www.phrma.org/en/About (last visited Jan. 24, 2022);
Members, PHARM. RES. & MFRS. OF AM., https://www.phrma.org/en/About/Members (last visited Jan. 24,
2022).
225. About, PHARM. RES. & MFRS. OF AM., supra note 224.
226. PHARM. RES. & MFRS. OF AM., supra note 221.
227. Id.
228. PHARM. RES. & MFRS. OF AM., CODE ON INTERACTIONS WITH HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS 5 (2019),
https://www.phrma.org/-/media/Project/PhRMA/PhRMA-Org/PhRMA-Org/PDF/A-C/Code-ofInteraction_FINAL21.pdf.
229. Id. at 14.
230. Id. at 3.
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conduct in connection with the opioid epidemic. But even when these laws have
been deployed, they have done little to deter the improper industry wrongdoing
that contributed to millions of opioid addictions and hundreds of thousands of
opioid overdose deaths. This Subpart explores the reasons criminal liability
against a pharmaceutical company and its executives has rarely been imposed.231
It critiques the current laws and explains how the lack of personal liability for
pharmaceutical executives has created a climate in which it is more profitable
for a pharmaceutical company to pay monetary penalties than to stop engaging
in illegal and unethical activity.232 Although suggestions on the appropriate
solution differ, there is a growing chorus of scholars and policymakers that have
called for criminal penalties to hold pharmaceutical companies and their top
executives accountable.233 This Subpart also explores solutions that have been
suggested by others, including the use of federal criminal racketeering laws.
Recent legislative initiatives, such as OCAA, are critiqued here as well.
1. Existing Legal Approaches Have Proven Ineffective
The laws that govern pharmaceutical companies’ conduct have failed to
end the opioid crisis for several reasons that relate to the statutes’ scope and
purpose and the challenges in proving the elements, especially intent.
a. Problems with Purpose and Scope
Existing laws do not target criminal misconduct specific to the
pharmaceutical industry and its executives. These statutes—FDCA, FCA, and
CSA—were implemented to regulate a broad range of corporate and individual
conduct outside the pharmaceutical industry. Consequently, because these laws
were not specifically designed or directed towards the pharmaceutical industry,
their application to industry practices is subject to challenge. In defending the
industry, company lawyers have argued that these statutes do not criminalize the
company’s practices and corporate executives’ behavior. For example, in July
2019, a federal grand jury charged an Ohio-based pharmaceutical distributor,
Miami-Luken, Inc., and two of the company’s former officials, with conspiring
to distribute controlled substances in violation of the drug trafficking provisions
of the CSA.234 According to the indictment, company executives and MiamiLuken sought to enrich themselves by distributing millions of painkillers to
doctors and pharmacies in rural Appalachia.235 The distributor and its officials
231. Brian Mann, As Drugmakers Face Opioid Lawsuits, Some Ask: Why Not Criminal Charges Too?, NPR
(Sept. 19, 2019, 6:37 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/09/19/762455218/as-drugmakers-face-opioid-lawsuitssome-ask-why-not-criminal-charges-too.
232. Reuben Guttman, Effective Compliance Means Imposing Individual Liability, 5 EMORY CORP. GOV. &
ACCOUNTABILITY REV. 77, 84 (2019); McCarthy, supra note 158, at 442.
233. Guttman, supra note 232, at 84; McCarthy, supra note 158, at 442; McCoy, supra note 164, at 48.
234. United States v. Rattini, No. 1:19-cr-81, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41872, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 5, 2021)
(indictment returned July 17, 2019).
235. Id.
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allegedly continued distributing the drugs to pharmacies even after being
advised by the DEA of their responsibilities as a wholesaler to ensure that drugs
were not being diverted and to report suspicious orders.236 It was further alleged
that Miami-Luken filled suspicious orders.237 Each of the defendants, including
Miami-Luken, was charged with conspiring to illegally distribute controlled
substances, a crime punishable by up to twenty years in prison.238 In April 2020,
Miami-Luken, and the individual defendants filed motions to dismiss the case,
asserting that their conduct did not violate the CSA.239 The motion accused the
government of seeking to punish behavior that is not prohibited by federal
law.240 According to the motion, “[t]he government’s action here violates the
constitutional bedrock of separation of powers,” and the indictment also violates
due process limits on regulatory authority and the DOJ’s prosecution policies.241
Even those statutes that are designed to regulate the industry directly do
not fully respond to the industry’s practices. The FDCA, for instance, prohibits
the introduction into interstate commerce of misbranded and adulterated drugs
and regulates the marketing and safety of drugs.242 Nevertheless, the statute is
not broad enough to address the range of pharmaceutical company misconduct.
For example, the FDCA does not address the problem of selling unnecessarily
large quantities of drugs. Thus, the FDCA cannot alone deter and punish
pharmaceutical companies and executives from engaging in bad behavior.
b. Problems with Proving Scienter
These statutes—in particular, the criminal FCA, CSA, and the felony
FDCA—have high burdens of proof on the element of intent. Under the FCA,
prosecutors must show that the defendant intentionally presented a false claim
to the government “knowing”243 the claim to be false.244 These elements of
intent are challenging to prove, especially against corporate executives.
Prosecutors rarely attempt to bring such charges and instead opt to assess civil
penalties under the FCA’s civil provisions.245 Similarly, the major challenge in
prosecuting pharmaceutical companies and their executives under the CSA is
proving the requisite intent. A violation of the CSA’s drug trafficking provision
must be committed “knowingly or intentionally.”246 Prosecutors routinely use

236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

Id.
Id.
Id.; 21 U.S.C. § 841(g).
Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss 32–37, United States v. Rattini, 1:19-cr-81-MWM (S.D. Ohio Apr. 30, 2020).
Id.
Id.
21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a),(g).
18 U.S.C. § 287; see Cooperative Grain, 476 F.2d at 59.
See 18 U.S.C. § 287.
Moriarty, supra note 183.
21 U.S.C. § 841(a).
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the CSA to target street drug dealers who distribute controlled substances
because the distribution by a non-registrant of the substance is illegal.247
In contrast, because drug manufacturers are registrants under the CSA, they
are authorized to distribute controlled substances.248 Thus, to prosecute an
authorized registrant under the trafficking provisions of the CSA, prosecutors
must prove that pharmaceutical executives intended to illicitly distribute
controlled substances.249 This is difficult to accomplish because drug companies
have historically shielded their executives from liability by creating an army of
lower-level employees that act as a buffer between the illegal conduct and the
executives.250
In the recent case against drug distributor RDC, prosecutors charged
several executives with the CSA felony trafficking violations.251 The CSA
charges require proof that the executives knew or reasonably should have known
that opioids the corporation distributed were dispensed outside the usual course
of professional practice.252 One of the RDC executives, the former chief
compliance officer, pled guilty to charges and agreed to cooperate with the
prosecution, but the other high-ranking executive, the former CEO, vowed to
fight the charges.253 His lawyer told the press that his client “is being framed,”
adding that “the government has it all wrong and is being used by others to cover
up their wrongdoing.”254 The CEO’s case has not yet been set for a hearing.255
Given the difficulty in establishing a corporate executive’s intent in a CSA drug
trafficking case, the likelihood of a conviction on the charges is uncertain.
Prosecuting pharmaceutical executives and companies under the FDCA
has proved equally challenging to demonstrate the required scienter. As
discussed above, most violations of the FDCA are strict liability offenses,
requiring no proof of culpable intent or even knowledge of an offense.256 The
strict liability provisions of FDCA apply to minor violations of the FDCA.257
247. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Federal Authorities Announce 11 Cases Charging Alleged
Drug Dealers with Providing Opioids that Led to Fatal Overdoses (May 13, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/usaocdca/pr/federal-authorities-announce-11-cases-charging-alleged-drug-dealers-providing-opioids
(describing
cases brought against non-registrants charged with CSA drug trafficking offenses).
248. 21 U.S.C. § 822(a).
249. Id.
250. McCarthy, supra note 158, at 441.
251. U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra note 207.
252. 21 U.S.C. § 822(a).
253. Gary Craig, Case Against Rochester Drug Cooperative Could Provide New Way to Fight Opioid
Epidemic, DEMOCRAT & CHRON. (Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.democratandchronicle.com/story/news/
2019/04/25/opioid-crisis-rochester-drug-cooperative-lawsuit-opioids/3549315002.
254. William K. Rashbaum, For First Time, Pharmaceutical Distributor Faces Federal Criminal Charges
Over Opioid Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/23/nyregion/opioid-crisisdrug-trafficking-rochester.html.
255. Stewart Bishop, Ex-Drug Distributor CEO Slated For January Opioid Trial, LAW360 (Sept. 1, 2021),
https://www-law360-com.etron.lls.edu/articles/1418083/print?section=compliance.
256. See 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(1).
257. Id. Some have suggested expanding the strict liability portions of the FDCA statutes so that it is not
necessary to prove intent to convict for a felony violation. McCoy, supra note 164, at 72. Removing the
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However, to secure a felony conviction under the FDCA, a prosecutor must
demonstrate that either the defendant knowingly violated the act or has violated
the act repeatedly.258 Although the FDCA contains provisions for imprisonment,
the provisions are not often used against opioid manufacturers. Prosecutors
instead tend to opt for civil or criminal financial penalties when bringing charges
under the FDCA.259 Even when charges are particularly egregious,
imprisonment is challenging to secure. For example, Purdue’s conduct in the
2007 misbranding case260 was egregious—the company’s sales representatives
falsely described the risk of addiction and OxyContin’s dangers to healthcare
providers.261 Nevertheless, prosecutors were unable to establish sufficient proof
of knowledge of wrongdoing, and misdemeanors, fines, and civil penalties were
imposed on them instead of jail time.262
c. Deferred Prosecutions Agreements are No Remedy
Rather than charging individual executives with a crime, the government
usually enters into deferred-prosecution agreements (“DPA”) or nonprosecution agreements (“NPA”) with the corporate entity.263 Under a DPA, the
prosecutor and the corporation agree that although the prosecutor will charge the
corporation in federal court, the prosecutor will defer the continued prosecution
of the charges until the end of a certain period of time agreed upon by both
parties.264 If the corporation has followed through on its obligations at the end
of the term of the agreement, the prosecutor will dismiss the charges.265 As part
knowledge element will undoubtedly make it easier for prosecutors to secure convictions, as knowledge is
notoriously difficult to prove in the corporate crime context. Id. at 68–69. However, strict liability offenses tend
to also carry lighter penalties because courts are reluctant to punish those that are convicted of offenses without
a mental state element. Id. at 70. Thus, it is highly unlikely that courts will sentence executives to long prison
terms for strict liability violations of the FDCA.
258. 21 U.S.C. § 333(b)(1); McCoy, supra note 164, at 72.
259. See e.g., McCoy, supra note 164, at 65 (providing examples and stating that “In 2008, Cephalon
pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor criminal violation of the FDCA for its misleading promotion of three drugs,
Actiq (aka fentanyl), Gabitril, and Provigil, and agreed to pay $425 million and entered into a five-year
Corporation Integrity Agreement (CIA). In 2009, Pfizer agreed to pay $2.3 billion for misbranding the painkiller
Bextra. In 2007, Merck paid $4.85 billion to settle for over-promoting the painkiller, Vioxx. In 2011, Merck
agreed to pay $950 million for illegally promoting Vioxx, and plead guilty to illegal marketing charges. In 2011,
Johnson & Johnson agreed to pay $70 million to settle DOJ charges related to foreign bribery. Johnson &
Johnson was again fined $2.2 billion in 2013, for promoting drugs not approved as safe by the FDA”).
260. United States v. Purdue Frederick Co., 495 F. Supp. 2d 569, 571–72 (W.D. Va. 2007); McCoy, supra
note 164, at 63; Katie Warren & Taylor Nicole Rogers, The Family Behind OxyContin Pocketed $10.7 Billion
from Purdue Pharma. Meet the Sacklers, Who Built Their $13 Billion Fortune Off the Controversial Opioid,
BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 23, 2020, 11:05 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/who-are-the-sacklers-wealthphilanthropy-oxycontin-photos-2019-1; Van Zee, supra note 84, at 223.
261. Purdue Frederick Co., 495 F. Supp. 2d at 571.
262. Id. at 576.
263. See Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, The Evolution of Corporate Criminal Settlements: An
Empirical Perspective on Non-Prosecution, Deferred Prosecution, and Plea Agreements, 52 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 537, 537 (2015).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 545. An NPA functions in a similar manner, only the government does not even take the step of
filing charges in federal court so as to defer them to a later date. Id.
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of the DPA or NPA, a drug company will typically pay a criminal fine out of the
corporate treasury and agree to implement internal reforms to prevent future
criminal fraud.266 One scholar has suggested that the government resorts to
DPAs rather than individual criminal prosecutions of executives because
proving intentional fraud is difficult given the organizational complexity and
diffused corporate decision-making responsibility.267 As such, the scholar
suggests the government conducts a cost-benefit analysis and determines that
the DPA is the safer bet for ensuring at least some corporate accountability.268
The 2007 case against Purdue Pharma is a textbook example of the
ineffective use of DPA to combat the crisis. The financial penalties assessed
against Purdue, even when married with misdemeanor criminal convictions, did
not alter pharmaceutical company conduct. Misconduct is profitable. Ultimately,
pharmaceutical companies make more money from engaging in misconduct and
paying penalties than they would if they did not engage in misconduct in the first
instance.269 Thus, for many pharmaceutical companies, “committing criminal
and civil violations have become part of their business model.”270 Decades of
civil and monetary penalties have not been enough to deter pharmaceutical
companies from their bad conduct.271
2. Current Proposed Solutions Fall Short
Neither legal scholars nor policymakers have developed an adequate legal
framework to address the opioid epidemic and hold pharmaceutical companies
and industry executives accountable for their role in the crisis. Most legal
scholarship and commentary on the opioid crisis focuses on distinct issues,
including the burdens to the legal system and health care system or the
decimation of communities because of opioid misuse and addiction.272 Few
discuss the interaction of civil litigation, criminal enforcement, and regulatory
tools that comprise the national response to the opioid crisis.273
For instance, scholars have reviewed strategies the federal government has
recently employed against the opioid crisis, such as (1) coordinated Law
Enforcement actions against drug cartels and traffickers in specific
communities; (2) Diversion Control actions against DEA registrants operating
outside the law and long-term engagement with pharmaceutical drug
266. See Brandon L. Garrett, The Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, 101 VA. L. REV. 1789, 1848 (2015).
267. Id. at 1825–26, 1836.
268. Id. at 1835.
269. McCoy, supra note 164, at 66.
270. Id. at 65.
271. Guttman, supra note 232, at 84; McCarthy, supra note 158, at 441; McCoy, supra note 164, at 66.
272. See Cuéllar & Humphreys, supra note 193, at 29 (exploring the political economy of the public health
law and regulation in relation to the opioid crisis).
273. See, e.g., Andrew M. Parker, Daniel Strunk & David A. Fiellin, State Responses to the Opioid Crisis,
46 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 367 (2018); Rachel L. Rothberg & Kate Stith, The Opioid Crisis and Federal Criminal
Prosecution, 46 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 292 (2018); Alex Wang & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Government Patent Use
to Address the Rising Cost of Naloxone: 28 U.S.C. § 1498 and Evzio, 46 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 472 (2018).
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manufacturers, wholesalers, pharmacies, and practitioners; and, (3) Community
Outreach through local partnerships that empower communities to take back
affected neighborhoods.274 Commentators have also examined the DOJ’s
enforcement strategies, like prescription-drug monitoring programs,275 forensic
analysis of drug ledgers,276 and enhanced sentencing requirements for drug
trafficking that results in death.277
Some commentators have called upon the Supreme Court to address the
problem by expanding the application of the Park Doctrine to allow for
pharmaceutical company executives to be held strictly liable for FDCS felony
violations.278 Others have argued that policymakers should probe the root cause
of the opioids epidemic by focusing on regulatory solutions like having the
federal government challenge patents, requiring sample sharing for
bioequivalence studies, and promoting cost-effectiveness research and
dissemination.279 Timothy S. Coyne has noted that in stark contrast to the crackcocaine epidemic, the legislative reaction to the current opioid epidemic “has
generally been far more treatment-oriented, with some exceptions.”280
Eugene McCarthy’s proposal suggests that charging criminal RICO will
resolve the challenge of holding high-level pharmaceutical executives
criminally accountable for the opioid epidemic.281 In theory, McCarthy’s
suggestion offers a possible means to impose criminal liability with the potential
for lengthy prison sentences upon individual corporate executives. The
application of RICO is therefore examined here.
a. Criminal RICO
In 1970, Congress enacted RICO to reign in criminal mafia activity.282
RICO makes it “unlawful for any person [to receive] any income derived,
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity.”283 Racketeering
is defined as “any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson,
274. Mike Gill, Gary Owen & Sean Fearns, DEA’s 360 Strategy: Attacking the Opioid Crisis on Three
Fronts, 64 U.S. ATT’YS BULL. 55, 55 (2016).
275. See Tara Kunkel, Data-Driven Approaches to Responding to the Opioid Epidemic, 64 U.S. ATT’YS
BULL. 79, 79–82 (2016).
276. See Jessica L. Affeldt, Drug Ledge Analysis Capabilities of the FBI’s Cryptanalysis and Racketeering
Records Unit, 64 U.S. ATT’YS BULL. 83, 83–86 (2016).
277. William J. Ihlenfeld II, “Death Results” Prosecutions Remain Effective Tool Post-Burrage, 64 U.S.
ATT’YS BULL. 45, 45–52 (2016).
278. McCoy, supra note 164, at 67–79.
279. Ameet Sarpatwari, Michael S. Sinha & Aaron S. Kesselheim, The Opioid Epidemic: Fixing a Broken
Pharmaceutical Market, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 463, 481–84 (2017).
280. Timothy S. Coyne, The Resurgence of Heroin: Benefitting from the Current Political Climate, 20 RICH.
PUB. INT. L. REV. 185, 190 (2017).
281. Marie Bussey-Garza, Say Hello to My Little Friend Civil Rico: The Third Circuit Green Lights
Insurance Shakedown of Big Pharma with in Re Avandia, 61 VILL. L. REV. 625 (2016) (explaining that
“Congress’s expressed purpose in enacting RICO was to keep organized crime from infiltrating legitimate
businesses”).
282. McCarthy, supra note 158, at 461.
283. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a).
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robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in a controlled
substance.”284 RICO allows the government to prosecute an entire criminal
enterprise and its constituent members at once, “[painting] with a broad brush”
to unite individual criminal acts into an organized pattern of crime.285 RICO
holds each criminal enterprise member—whether the CEO or the salesperson—
accountable for conduct of the other members of the crime syndicate.286 It thus
prevents those at the highest level of the enterprise from escaping legal liability
for the conduct of others who carry out the aims of the enterprise. RICO
aggregates all enterprise members’ crimes into the single offense of
participating in the criminal enterprise and imposes the same punishment on all
participants regardless of their rank in—or illegal contribution to—the
organization.287 The enterprise element also allows prosecutors to introduce
previously inadmissible evidence about the crime syndicate’s history, structure,
and operations.288 Thus, RICO has been an attractive tool to address corporate
fraud.289 RICO includes both criminal and civil290 violation provisions. Those
convicted under RICO face criminal fines, forfeiture of interests obtained
through prohibited racketeering activity, and imprisonment for up to twenty
years “or for life, if related to racketeering activity for which the maximum
sentence includes life imprisonment.”291
In the context of pharmaceutical company fraud, RICO permits charging
pharmaceutical company executives, sales representatives, doctors, and lawyers
at once for participating in the “association-in-fact criminal enterprise.”292 In
proposing RICO as a promising solution to criminalize pharmaceutical
executive misconduct, Eugene McCarthy likened pharmaceutical companies’
structure to organized crime syndicates. He called for criminal prosecution of
executives using RICO.293 Professor McCarthy asserts that, like the Mafia,
pharmaceutical companies routinely engage in illegal practices, but companies
shield executives from prosecution “simply by delegating crimes to underlings
who would take the fall for the larger organization.”294 He argues that RICO

284. Id. § 1961(a)(A).
285. Peter J. Henning, RICO Charge in Pharmaceutical Case May Signal Tougher Tactics, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/12/business/dealbook/rico- charge-in-pharmaceutical-casemay-signal-tougher-tactics.html.
286. Id.
287. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c); Brian Goodwin, Civil Versus Criminal RICO and the “Eradication” of La
Cosa Nostra, 28 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 279, 287 (2002).
288. James B. Jacobs & Lauryn P. Gouldin, Cosa Nostra: The Final Chapter?, 25 CRIME & JUST. 129, 170
(1999).
289. McCarthy, supra note 158, at 442.
290. RICO’s civil provisions allow those harmed by prohibited RICO activity to sue for triple damages,
litigation costs, and attorney’s fees. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
291. Id. § 1963(a).
292. McCarthy, supra note 158, at 463.
293. McCarthy, supra note 158, at 441.
294. Id.
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would allow the government to prosecute high-ranking members of an
organization through their connection to the organization in general.295
The idea of using RICO to impose criminal liability on pharmaceutical
executives is appealing, but using RICO to prosecute pharmaceutical company
executives includes the hurdles of establishing intent and causation for the
predicate RICO offense.296
The Insys Therapeutics prosecution illustrates the limitations of using
RICO to hold pharmaceutical executives criminally accountable. There,
prosecutors brought multiple charges at once, including for predicate act
criminal violations of the CSA for drug distribution, wire fraud, and conspiracy
to illegally distribute Subsys.297 The jury returned guilty verdicts against the
company and the individual defendants, but the court partially vacated the
verdicts questioning the prosecutor’s use of a CSA violation as the predicate
offense for RICO.298 The judge stated that the prosecutors failed to demonstrate
“that Defendants agreed and intended that healthcare practitioners would illicitly
distribute Subsys to patients that did not need it at an unnecessarily high
dose . . . .”299 The judge found that the corporate executives’ conduct constituted
“garden variety” fraud, not a CSA violation.300 The court was “very reluctant
[to] disturb[] a jury verdict” but found that “even though the evidence could be
readily understood as proving that defendants did not care whether patients
needed the drug, that still is not enough to prove the requisite intent.’”301
Although the individual defendant executives faced up to thirty-three years in
prison and more than $300 million in restitution, the court sentenced the founder
to five and a half years imprisonment, while six other executives received
between one to three years imprisonment.302 Insys Therapeutics also agreed to
a $255 million settlement.303 The Insys case demonstrates that although RICO
offers some benefits in terms of admissibility of evidence and the possibility of
bringing an array of charges against multiple corporate actors, the problem of
proving the predicate offense remains challenging because such offenses, like

295. Id.
296. Bussey-Garza, supra note 281, at 626–27; Judge Vacates Criminal Convictions Against Pharma Execs
in First-of-its-Kind Opioid Case, ADVISORY BD. (Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.advisory.com/dailybriefing/2019/12/02/opioid-cases; 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (containing list of predicate offenses applicable to RICO
violations, as RICO requires first establishing the presence of a predicate offense).
297. Henning, supra note 9.
298. Memorandum and Order on Defendants’ Motions for Judgment of Acquittal and for a New Trial at 11,
U.S. v. Babich, No. 1:16-cr-10343-ADB (D. Mass. 2016).
299. Id.
300. Villani, supra note 11.
301. ADVISORY BD., supra note 296.
302. United States v. Michael Babich, Alec Burlakoff, Richard Simon, Sunrise Lee, Joseph Rowan, and
Michael Gurry, John Kapoor, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (May 7, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/victim-andwitness-assistance-program/united-states-v-michael-babich-alec-burlakoff-richard-simon-sunrise-lee-josephrowan-and.
303. Chris Villani, Insys Founder John Kapoor Gets 5½ Years, LAW360 (Jan. 23, 2020, 4:23 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1237076/insys-founder-john-kapoor-gets-5-years.
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CSA violations, contain elements that are difficult to prove. RICO, therefore, is
no panacea.
b. Recent Legislation
Policymakers have proposed legislative fixes that are either tangential or
problematic. As discussed, the stringent scienter requirements that apply to the
CSA criminal trafficking, the FCDA felony misbranding, and FCA criminal
false claims violations make it difficult to secure convictions, particularly for
pharmaceutical industry actors who are not directly involved in day-to-day drug
distribution decisions. Likewise, filing criminal RICO charges requires proof of
a predicate offense like a CSA, FDCA, or FCA violation that will have a specific
intent element that may be hard to prove.
In the last several years, , however, momentum and bipartisan political will
have coalesced in the legislative branch to address the opioid epidemic. A few
laws have been enacted which address some aspects of the epidemic. For
example, H.R. 6, the Substance Use-Disorder Prevention that Promotes Opioid
Recovery and Treatment (“SUPPORT”) for Patients and Communities Act,304
passed with overwhelming bipartisan support and was signed into law in
2018.305 The act appropriates funds and amends current federal law governing
welfare programs, law enforcement, licit and illicit drug use, and public health,
among other measures, to increase resources for treating those with opioid use
disorder and reduce the use of opioids in healthcare settings.306 Other legislative
initiatives also sought to address the problem of the over-prescription of opioids.
The Using Data to Prevent Opioid Diversion Act, signed into law in 2019, aims
to reduce the diversion of opioids by requiring more frequent reporting of
suspiciously large opioid orders and providing additional transparency in opioid
distribution reporting.307 Although the legislative initiatives that have been
introduced and gained the most traction are important, they are tangential,
existing around the margins of the larger problem—how to hold the
pharmaceutical industry and its executives criminally accountable for their
conduct creating the opioid epidemic. An effort to address that problem in 2018
directly took the form of the OCAA of 2018.

304. Support for Patients and Communities Act of 2018, H.R. 6, 115th Cong. (2d Sess. 2018).
305. Cameron Fox, Substance Use-Disorder Prevention that Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment
(SUPPORT) for Patients and Communities Act (Public Law 115-271), SCIPOL (Jan. 24, 2019),
[https://perma.cc/WUM9-3J8W].
306. Id.
307. Specifically, the Using Data to Prevent Opioid Diversion Act amends the CSA to require the attorney
general to provide information to drug manufacturers and distributors regarding opioid sales and distribution.
Using Data to Prevent Opioid Diversion Act of 2018, H.R. 6491, 115th Cong. (2d Sess. 2018). Manufacturers
and distributors are required to review this information and detect suspicious orders (for example, orders of
abnormal size, orders that differ substantially from a normal arrangement, or orders of unusual frequency) or
unusual patterns of distribution.
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c. Opioid Crisis Accountability Act (“OCAA”)
The OCAA, introduced by Bernie Sanders and Michael Bennet in the
Senate, and then re-introduced in 2019 by former congress member Tulsi
Gabbard and Ro Khanna in the House of Representatives,308 was designed to
target pharmaceutical company marketing practices that led to “creating and
exacerbating the opioid epidemic in the United States.”309 If enacted, the OCAA
would have provided that it is “unlawful for any person involved in the
manufacture or distribution of an opioid to engage in dubious marketing or
distribution practice with respect to an opioid.”310 The bill broadly defined
“dubious marketing” to include making false representations about an opioid’s
addictiveness, supplying to states a medically unreasonable quantity of opioids,
and failing to report orders for opioids “that the person knows are not being
dispensed in a medically reasonable manner.”311
The bill called for both direct and vicarious liability for corporate actors.
All individuals who directly violated the statute by engaging in dubious
marketing or distribution practices would be fined the amount of their salaries
plus the increased value of their company assets for every year of violation.312
They would also be subject to imprisonment of up to ten years for CSA Schedule
II drugs or up to five years for Schedule III drugs.313 The OCAA would have
subjected corporate entities to a civil penalty equal to 75% of the total profit of
opioid sales for which it engaged in dubious marketing and distribution
practices.314
As for vicarious liability, the bill provided that if a company violates the
statute, certain executives would be subject to civil financial penalties “without
regard to the participation of such individuals in, or knowledge of such
individuals of, the violation.”315 The CEO would incur a civil penalty in the
amount of their salary for the period of the violation and the increase in the value
of the ownership interest held in the company during the period of violation.316
In addition, other executives who led finance, research, marketing, or sales
departments would be fined 25% of their salaries and the increased value of their
company assets for every year of violation.317
The bill also, among other things, would have provided for assessment of
fees against each company that manufactured or distributed any opioid between
1993 and the date of enactment.318 Companies that fail to pay the fee would lose
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.

Opioid Crisis Accountability Act of 2019, H.R. 2917, 116th Cong. (1st Sess. 2019).
H.R. 2917, 116th Cong. Preamble (2019).
H.R. 2917 § 2(b).
Id. § 2(a)(1)(C).
Id. § 2(c)(1).
Id. § 2(c)(1)(A).
Id. § 2(c)(1)(B).
Id. § 2(c)(2).
Id. § 2(c)(2)(A).
Id. § 2(c)(2)(B).
Id. § 2(e)(1) (2019).
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FDA approval to market the opioid.319 This assessment fee and any other
financial penalties imposed for violating the act would be collected in an “Opioid
Reimbursement Fund” intended to “combat the misuse and abuse of opioids in
the United States.”320 In addition, the bill would have terminated or reduced the
period of market exclusivity that the company held for the opioid that had been
marketed in violation of the proposed statute. 321
The OCAA failed to advance out of committee and expired at the end of
the 116th Congress, 322 but it contained some provisions which, if enacted,
would have been helpful in holding the pharmaceutical industry and their
executives criminally liable for their roles in the opioid epidemic. Although
aspects of the bill were legally problematic, it offers a good place to start. To
develop a workable solution, discussed in Part III, the OCAA’s positive
attributes and shortcomings are considered.
(i) The Positives of the OCAA
First, the OCAA appropriately focused on the pharmaceutical industry. It
targeted marketing practices specific to pharmaceutical companies for a single
class of drugs—opioids.323 The OCAA was promising because it provided
prosecutors with an act designed explicitly for pharmaceutical companies, which
would prevent exclusively relying on existing laws like the CSA, the FCA, and
the FCDA that do not directly apply to the conduct at issue in these cases.
Second, violations of the OCAA’s provisions imposed personal financial
liability and prison time for executives.324 The financial liability provision
targeted executives’ personal wealth and not only the large coffers of their
companies. More importantly, the potential for imprisonment is a consequence
that few pharmaceutical executives want to endure.325 The prospect of a criminal
sentence serves to deter others in the future.326
Third, the OCAA’s requirement to establish the Opioids Reimbursement
Fund derived from appropriations from the United States Treasury and monies
319. Id. § 2(e)(4) (2019).
320. Id. § 2(e)(5) (2019).
321. Id. § 3(a) (2019).
322. See All Actions, Opioid Crisis Accountability Act of 2019, H.R. 2917, 116th Cong. (2019),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/2917/allactions?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22opioid+and+distribution%22%5D%7D&r=1&overview=closed
&s=1#tabs; Media coverage on the OCAA is scarce, and the bill was not often discussed—not even by the
Representatives and Senators that proposed it. Notably, Senator Bernie Sanders and Representative Tulsi
Gabbard, who proposed a version of the bill in 2018 and 2019 respectively, both announced their bids for the
2020 presidential election soon after proposing the OCAA.
323. H.R. 2917, Preamble.
324. Id. § 2(c)(2).
325. Kuchler et al., supra note 148. In a video interview with PBS, Insys executive Alex Burloff, who was
sentenced to twenty-six months imprisonment for illegally marketing the opioid Subsys, describes how he knew
that it was likely Insys could face financial penalties, but that he never expected to face prison time for his illegal
behavior and reflecting on how he did not want to go to prison for his conduct. Id.
326. Guttman, supra note 232, at 84; McCarthy, supra note 158, at 442.
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generated from penalties imposed for violations of the law was commendable
because it would provide much-needed financial resources to address the opioid
epidemic. More funding is needed for evidence-based addiction treatment, drug
research, and other programs to address the financial burden imposed by the
crisis on states and local communities directly affected by the epidemic.327
Finally, the OCAA’s provision providing the revocation of market
exclusivity for the covered opioid was an apt punishment.328 During the drug
exclusivity period, the opioid manufacturer enjoys a monopoly on the drug and
can profit from its sale without significant competition.329 Opioids are often
high-grossing products for pharmaceutical companies.330 Eliminating
exclusivity means that competitors can release generic versions of the drug,
taking the offending drug’s market share. This consequence will result in a
significant financial loss for companies that invest millions into research and
development. The OCAA’s loss of market exclusivity provision also properly
precluded an offending company from avoiding the financial losses by engaging
in “product hopping,” which is the practice of reformulating a previously
approved drug to obtain a new drug application under the FDCA.331 Thus, the
potential for loss of exclusivity and prohibition on product hopping may create
a strong deterrent from engaging in misconduct.
(ii) Limitations of the OCAA
Although the OCAA contains some promising elements to target and
eradicate pharmaceutical companies and their executives’ wrongdoing, other
aspects of the bill are problematic and raise legal questions.
First, the OCAA employed specific terms that it failed to define adequately.
For example, although the OCAA applied to “opioids” and defined “covered
opioid” as “a prescription opioid drug,”332 the term “opioid” was not otherwise
defined. Given the wide variety of opiate substances and their derivatives that
exist, and the high potential for abuse and addiction, a comprehensive and
precise definition of the substances subject to the statute would lend clarity to
the law and assist those—companies, regulators, and the public—in
understanding and complying with the law. Likewise, even though the bill
criminalized the supplying quantities of opioids that are not “medically
reasonable,”333 it provides the Secretary of Health and Human Services and
327. Christine Vestal, Opioid Money Has Helped, But States Want More, PEW CHARITABLE TRS.:
STATELINE (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2019/01/30/
opioid-money-has-helped-but-states-want-more.
328. H.R. 2917 § 3(a)(1).
329. Exclusivity and Generic Drugs: What Does It Mean?, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/files/drugs/published/Exclusivity-and-Generic-Drugs-What-Does-It-Mean-.pdf.
330. Notably, during his PBS interview, Insys executive Alex Burloff stated that Subsys accounted for such
a large portion of Insys’ revenue that the public would never have even heard of Insys if it did not sell Subsys.
331. H.R. 2917 § 3(a)(3).
332. H.R. 2917 § 3(b).
333. Id. § 2(d)(1)(A).
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Attorney General with broad discretion to “establish a formula for determining
the quantity of opioids that is not medically reasonable with respect to a
community or State.”334 The bill suggested that the Secretary and Attorney
General should “as appropriate, [work with] provider groups” and patient
advocacy groups to develop the formula.335 It is important to define the terms of
art such as “medically reasonable” to provide guidance to the industry and notice
to the world as to prohibited conduct. It is likewise appropriate to give regulators
the express authority to draft regulations that define statutory terms. However,
in using language like “as appropriate” and failing to describe the formula that
should apply, the OCAA gave policymakers and regulators unfettered discretion
to determine the quantity of opioids a pharmaceutical company can reasonably
sell. Likewise, the list of stakeholders with whom the regulators should consult
to define these terms should have been more specifically defined to include
independent experts and health professionals. Developing guidelines should not
open the door for the industry and its lobbyists to exert undue influence in this
process.
Second, the OCAA provisions describing the required intent were overly
complicated and would have created challenges of proof. Indeed, the OCAA
“dubious marketing” provisions mandated proof of knowledge—that the
defendant knew the marketing representations were false or knew that they
supplied opioids knowing that that the quantities distributed were not medically
reasonable or failed to report orders for distribution that they knew were not
being dispensed in a medically reasonable manner.336 Requiring proof that
executives have knowledge of this conduct would prove difficult for
prosecutors.
In an apparent effort to address the problem of proving knowledge, the
OCAA provisions that govern the distribution of opioids (and the failure to
report such distributions) contain a rebuttable presumption of knowledge that
the distributor was aware that the quantity of opioids distributed was not
medically reasonable.337 This presumption shifts the burden of proving the lack
of intent to the defendants. However, such a presumption would not satisfy due
process unless the presumed facts are rationally related to the established
facts.338 To pass constitutional muster, a sufficient logical link must exist
334. Id. § 2(d)(1)(A).
335. Id.
336. See id. § 2(a)(1).
337. Id. § 2(d)(1)(B).
338. Although the legislature, by statute, may create inferences and presumptions, the facts proved must
bear a rational relationship to the fact to be inferred. If they do not, the statutory inference or presumption cannot
stand. With respect to the validity of statutory presumptions, the United States Supreme Court has observed:
“[A] statutory presumption cannot be sustained if there be no rational connection between the fact proved and
the ultimate fact presumed, if the inference of the one from proof of the other is arbitrary because of lack of
connection between the two in common experience. This is not to say that a valid presumption may not be
created upon a view of relation broader than that a jury might take in a specific case. But where the inference is
so strained as not to have a reasonable relation to the circumstances of life as we know them, it is not competent
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between the fact—that they distributed the drug—and the inference—that they
knew the drug was distributed in a medically unreasonable quantity under the
formula established by the Secretary of Health and Human Services and
Attorney General.339
Questions of legal viability also arise in connection with the vicarious
liability provisions in the OCAA, which imposed high financial penalties upon
corporate executives for the corporate entity’s conduct. For example, the
Constitution may limit the penalties that the law can impose based on strict
liability. Imposing strict liability for vicarious offenses would expand the
holding in Park and expose pharmaceutical executives to sanctions regardless
of their knowledge, intent, or ability to prevent a violation. The Supreme Court
has not directly addressed whether the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
limits the penalties imposed under the Park Doctrine. Federal appellate courts
have also wrestled with this issue and are not all in accord.340 In Staples v.
United States, the Court noted that for most strict liability offenses, “penalties
commonly are relatively small” and that “imposing severe punishments for
offenses that require no [culpable mental state] would seem incongruous.”341
Moreover, although the Court in Park upheld the imposition of strict liability on
the facts before it, it rejected the proposition that “a finding of guilt could be
predicated solely on respondent’s corporate position,” instead of requiring a
finding that the executive had the “authority and responsibility” to address his
company’s violation.342 Thus, the strict liability provisions of the OCAA may
be infirm.
Third, the size of the penalties and fees in the OCAA raises separate
questions, including whether such penalties would qualify as excessive fines
for the legislature to create it as a rule governing the procedure of courts.” Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463,
467–68 (1943) (footnotes omitted); see also Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 34–36 (1969) (a criminal
statutory presumption regarding the knowledge element of a crime is unconstitutional “unless it can at least be
said with substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on
which it is made to depend”) (footnote omitted).
339. H.R. 2917 § 2(d)(1)(B).
340. See, e.g., DeCoster, 828 F.3d at 635 (upholding three month prison sentences as not grossly
disproportionate to the gravity of their misdemeanor offenses and rejecting a claim that due process concerns
prevent individual corporate officers from being sentenced to prison for a crime involving no mens rea on their
part because it is based solely on vicarious liability) cert denied, 137 S. Ct. 2160 (2017). But see Lady J. Lingerie,
Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 176 F.3d 1358, 1367–68 (11th Cir. 1999) (rejecting the application of Park where
the sentence includes period of incarceration and holding that due process prohibits the state from imprisoning
a person without proof of some form of personal blameworthiness more than a “responsible relation”). This
unease with the idea of strict liability in the criminal context is reflected in DeCoster. In that case, Judge Murphy,
writing for the majority, found both that the responsible corporate officer doctrine implies an aspect of
blameworthiness, but also that the record showed that the defendants in that case were “liable for negligently
failing to prevent the salmonella outbreak” at issue in the case. Id. at 633. Judge Gruender concurred but wrote
“separately in order to make clear [his] view that Park requires a finding of negligence in order to convict a
responsible corporate officer” and joined Judge Murphy only because he and the district court found the
defendants negligent. Id. at 637 (Gruender, J., concurring). Finally, Judge Beam dissented based on his belief
that Due Process requires mens rea for a criminal conviction. Id. at 640 (Beam, J., dissenting).
341. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 616–17 (1994).
342. See Park, 421 U.S. at 674.

346

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 73:2

barred by the Eighth Amendment. In considering a constitutional challenge to
the imposition of such a penalty, a reviewing court would determine if the
payment, whether styled as a “fee” or “civil penalty,” constitutes a punishment
that is “grossly disproportional” to the gravity of the offense.
Moreover, the aspect of the OCAA, which imposes a fee upon all entities
that manufactured or distributed opioids after January 1993, and that punishes
those that fail to timely pay the assessed fee, may implicate the Ex Post Facto
Clause of the Constitution. Although the ban on ex post facto laws generally
applies only to penal laws and thus may not implicate the OCAA, the Supreme
Court has held that “the ex post facto effect of a law cannot be evaded by giving
a civil form to that which is essentially criminal.”343 The fees could be
considered punitive measures subject to the Ex Post Facto Clause if they were
“so punitive either in purpose or effect” that they could not be deemed civil in
nature.344
Finally, the OCAA is backward facing. Although the OCAA garnered
virtually no media attention, one commentator critiqued the bill as “too little, too
late,” observing that limiting the quantity of opioids sold “would have been very
helpful fifteen years ago” at the beginning of the opioid crisis, but is not likely
to help now.345 The OCAA focuses almost exclusively on the conduct well after
it occurred and provides little guidance for the industry going forward to avoid
the next prescription drug epidemic that may be on the horizon.
III. THE 360-DEGREE SOLUTION: THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE
MANUFACTURER AND MARKETING ACCOUNTABILITY ACT
(THE “CS MAMA”)
For more than one hundred years, the federal government has been
applying criminal law solutions to the abuse of substances derived from
opium.346 The government has also sought to regulate those involved in the
distribution of those substances in society.347 However, none of those efforts
have proved successful.348 The opioid epidemic—boosted by the COVID-19
pandemic—shows no sign of ending. As discussed in Part II, although some
proposals to address the opioid epidemic argue for employing existing statutes
343. Burgess v. Salmon, 97 U.S. 381, 385 (1878).
344. To determine whether a fee is punitive, courts use an “intent-effects test.” Under the test, the fee is
punitive if the legislature intended the statute to be punitive. Moyer v. Alameida, 184 F. App’x 633, 636 (9th
Cir. 2006). For example, the Ninth Circuit found that an imposition of a retroactive 10% fee on a prisoner’s
wages to pay off restitution fines was punitive and therefore gave rise to an ex post facto claim. Id. at 637. There,
the fee was punitive because the legislature had enacted the statute to increase funds available for restitution.
The OCAA’s fee is similarly intended to raise funds for restitution and to punish pharmaceutical companies for
their role in the opioid epidemic. Therefore, it is unlikely to pass muster under intent-effects test.
345. Lawrence Greenblatt, Sanders’s Proposed Opioid Legislation Is Too Focused on The Past, THE HILL
(Apr. 18, 2018), https://thehill.com/opinion/healthcare/383819-sanders-proposed-opioid-legislation-is-toofocused-on-the-past.
346. See supra Part I and II.
347. See supra Part I and II.
348. See supra Part II.
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or offer narrow remedies focused on discrete aspects of the problem, all of those
methods and proposals have significant drawbacks, and none of those currently
in place have been effective in altering the behavior of the pharmaceutical
industry.
This Article offers something new—the Controlled Substance
Manufacturer and Marketing Accountability Act (“CS MAMA”). This
comprehensive, omnibus proposal blends the most useful aspects of the OCAA
with other existing legal frameworks.349 It also incorporates new ideas,
recognizing the political and economic forces that shape the epidemic. The CS
MAMA is a holistic, end-to-end approach designed to align private incentives
with public interests. This Part explains CS MAMA’s three pillars aimed at (1)
ending the drug development to drug addiction cycle by creating new norms for
the industry actors, (2) inspiring responsible corporate conduct by reinvigorating
the regulatory environment, and (3) remedying prior harms by creating a fund
of financial resources that can be called upon to address the epidemic going
forward. Finally, the feasibility of the proposal is considered.
A. THE OBJECTIVES OF CS MAMA
Policymakers and the public have consistently expressed outrage that few
if any pharmaceutical companies or their executives have been criminally
punished for their conduct in bringing about the opioid epidemic.350
Acknowledging this reality, the legislative response to the pharmaceutical
industry’s role in causing the crisis must be evaluated and observed through the
lens of the criminal justice system’s penological objectives.
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized legitimate penological schemes to
enforce criminal punishment based on retribution,351 deterrence,352
incapacitation,353 and rehabilitation.354 The criminal justice system in the United

349. See infra Appendix.
350. Chris McGreal, “Your Actions are Sickening”: Sackler Hearing Inspires Rare Bipartisan Disgust, THE
GUARDIAN (Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/dec/18/sackler-congress-opioidpurdue-hearing; Brian Mann, Critics Want Sacklers to Face Criminal Charges for Role in Opioid Crisis, NPR
(Nov. 25, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/11/25/938801514/critics-want-sacklers-to-face-criminal-chargesfor-role-in-opioid-crisis.
351. Retribution, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed., 2004) (“Punishment imposed as a repayment or
revenge for the offense committed; requital.”).
352. Deterrence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed., 2004) (“The act or process of discouraging certain
behavior, particularly by fear; [especially], as a goal of criminal law, the prevention of criminal behavior by fear
of punishment.”). HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 39 (1968) (describing
deterrence as “the inhibiting effect that punishment, either actual or threatened, will have on the actions of those
who are otherwise disposed to commit crimes”).
353. Incapacitation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed., 2004) (“The action of disabling or depriving of
legal capacity.”).
354. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 959, 999 (1991); Rehabilitation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th
ed., 2004) (“The process of seeking to improve a criminal’s character and outlook so that he or she can function
in society without committing other crimes.”).
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States has placed different emphasis on these four goals over time.355 These
goals are the result of a mixture of the two theories of punishment—
utilitarianism and retributivism.356 Utilitarians are primarily concerned with the
future of society.357 They believe that a person balances the expected benefits of
the criminal conduct with its risks, such as detection and punishment, and will
avoid criminal activity if the perceived potential pain outweighs the expected
potential pleasure stemming from the rewards of committing the criminal
conduct.358 On the other hand, retributivists focus on punishing the past acts of
wrongdoers who perform criminal acts based on the belief that punishment is
deserved when the wrongdoer freely chooses to violate rules enacted by
society.359 Although the utilitarian theory has dominated the American system
of criminal justice,360 the retributivist concept of moral blameworthiness, as a
justification for punishment, has also influenced the theory of punishment.361
More recently, the concepts of restoration and reparation have also gained
recognition as legitimate objectives of criminal punishment.362 Restorative
justice does not fit neatly into either the utilitarian or the retributivist camp. The
theory focuses on the harm done to the victim by healing the wounds and
restoring the offender to the community.363 The components of CS MAMA are
organized and evaluated according to these penological objectives.
355. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 999. Prior to 1970, the American criminal justice system considered the
principal goals of punishment to be rehabilitation and incapacitation; See James Q. Whitman, Equality in
Criminal Law: The Two Divergent Western Roads, 1 J. LEG. ANALYSIS, 119, 127 (2009). However, beginning
in the early 1970s, there was a dramatic shift toward determinative sentencing guidelines, which resulted in the
restriction of judicial discretion. See id. at 127–28. Today, retribution seems to be the principal focus of the
criminal justice system. See id. at 128.
356. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 22 (3d ed., 2001) (arguing that the criminal
law system that has developed in the United States is not philosophically consistent, as “some rules of criminal
responsibility are primarily retributive in nature, whereas others are utilitarian in character”); Caprice L. Roberts,
Ratios, (Ir)rationality & Civil Rights Punitive Awards, 39 AKRON L. REV. 1019, 1033 (2006).
357. See DRESSLER, supra note 356, at 14–15.
358. See id.
359. See id. at 16. “Just desert” stems from retributive theory, and refers to the mandatory punishment of a
morally culpable wrongdoer; see Joshua Dressler, Hating Criminals: How Can Something That Feels So Good
Be Wrong?, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1448, 1451 (1990). Retributivists believe that it is morally wrong to punish an
innocent person even if society might benefit from the action, and would rather have a guilty person go
unpunished than an innocent person pay their “just deserts” for a crime that they did not commit. See id.
360. Stephen F. Smith, Proportional Mens Rea, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 127, 146–47 (2009); William L.
Barnes, Jr., Revenge on Utilitarianism: Renouncing a Comprehensive Economic Theory of Crime and
Punishment, 74 IND. L.J. 627, 629–30 (1999).
361. See Smith, supra note 360, at 146.
362. Donald H. J. Hermann, Restorative Justice and Retributive Justice: An Opportunity for Cooperation
or an Occasion for Conflict in the Search for Justice, 16 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 71, 94 (2017); Mark Umbreit,
Crime Victims Seeking Fairness, Not Revenge: Toward Restorative Justice, 53 FED. PROBATION 52, 52 (1989).
363. “The new paradigm of ‘restorative justice’ defines crime as a violation of one person, by another, not
a violation of the state. Dialogue and negotiations are normative, with a focus upon problem-solving for the
future rather than establishing blame for past behavior. Rather than the imposition of severe punishment,
restorative justice emphasizes restitution as a means of restoring both parties; reconciliation and restoration of
the parties is the goal. Instead of ignoring the victims and placing offenders in a passive role, the new paradigm
of restorative justice places both victim and offender in active and interpersonal problem-solving roles.”
Umbreit, supra note 362, at 52.
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1. Retribution Deterrence and Incapacitation
Pharmaceutical companies and their executives who engaged in
misconduct contributing to the opioid epidemic should be punished and deterred
from future wrongdoing. The sanction imposed should be calibrated to end the
conduct and serve as a warning to others. To meet these objectives, the CS
MAMA includes elements that clearly define the drugs to which it applies and
precisely identifies prohibited behavior. It also includes an intent requirement
that is reasonably calibrated to how the pharmaceutical industry operates and
contains penalties designed to punish, deter, and incapacitate.
a. Coherent Elements
The OCAA inspires the CS MAMA. Building upon the best elements of
the OCAA, the CS MAMA contains provisions that clarify the scope of the drugs
subject to the bill and clearly identifies the prohibited conduct and required
intent to violate the law.
(i) Regulated Substances
As proposed, the OCAA would have regulated the marketing and
distribution practices of only an unspecified class of “opioids.”364 Curbing the
opioid epidemic is an important goal. As the history described in Part I teaches,
however, without applying the law to other opiates and other highly addictive
natural and engineered substances, the cycle of drug development, marketing,
and addiction will repeat. If the past is any guide, it is only a matter of time
before pharmaceutical companies develop and market derivatives of other
controlled substances such as MDMA and ketamine.365 Thus, to address the
current opioid epidemic and anticipate the next, the CS MAMA includes a
definition of “Regulated Substance,” which expressly applies not only to the
opioids which gave rise to the current epidemic but to all Schedule II and III
controlled substances.366

364. See generally Opioid Crisis Accountability Act of 2019, H.R. 2917, 116th Cong. (2019).
365. Ryan Troup, These Two Companies Could Be Turning LSD, Magic Mushrooms, Ketamine and MDMA
Into the Next Blockbuster Drugs, CANNABIS INV. (May 22, 2020), https://www.thecannabisinvestor.ca/
these-2-companies-are-turning-lsd-magic-mushrooms-ketamine-and-mdma-into-the-next-blockbuster-drugs
(describing how there are already several companies looking to create the next “blockbuster drug” from several
controlled substances).
366. See infra Appendix, CS MAMA § 2 Definitions, (a) “Regulated Substance.” Although beyond the
scope of this Article, the DOJ should also re-evaluate how drugs are classified under the CSA Schedules in light
of recent legal and scientific developments. For example, marijuana is currently classified as a Schedule I drug,
along with heroin and other dangerous substances, despite the various accepted medicinal uses for marijuana in
recent years. German Lopez, The Federal Drug Scheduling System, Explained, VOX (Aug. 11, 2016, 9:05 AM),
https://www.vox.com/2014/9/25/6842187/drug-schedule-list-marijuana.
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(ii) Prohibited Behavior
Like the OCAA,367 the CS MAMA would amend FDCA to render it
“unlawful for any person who manufactures or distributes a regulated substance
to engage in a dubious marketing or distribution practice with respect to a
regulated substance.”368 The bill defines “dubious marketing” to include making
false representations about a regulated substance’s addictiveness, supplying to
states a medically unreasonable quantity of the regulated substance, and failing
to report such orders.369 The CS MAMA would also afford the Secretary of
Health and Human Services and the Attorney General the discretion to develop
a formula that defines “medically reasonable” and requires that regulators
consult with independent experts in doing so.370
Although dubious marketing practices have been a hallmark of the
campaign to sell opioids, the industry’s harmful behavior is not solely related to
marketing or distribution practices. As the Insys Therapeutics case illustrates,
the pharmaceutical industry also has a history of bribing and buying
prescribers.371 Also, like Purdue Pharma, drug firms have routinely submitted
false and misleading studies to regulators when seeking drug approvals.372 Thus,
the CS MAMA expands the prohibited activities to include providing financial
payments and incentives to prescribers and misrepresenting results of scientific
studies to regulators.373 Bringing these behaviors into this statute’s scope will
deter pharmaceutical companies and their executives from these common
wrongful practices and bring the prohibitions in line with the conditions on the
ground in the industry.
(iii) Rational Scienter Requirement
Unlike the OCAA’s scienter requirements which are undefined and raise
constitutional concerns,374 the CS MAMA expressly prescribes the required
intent to violate the statute. A conviction of the statute as a felony demands proof
of “knowledge.”375 In contrast to the CSA, felony FDCA violations and criminal
FCA violations which contain unspecified knowledge requirements that
prosecutors have struggled to prove, knowledge under the CS MAMA expressly
includes actual knowledge, acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of
the matter, or acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the
information.376 Defining knowledge to incorporate willful blindness and

367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.

H.R. 2917 § 2(a)(1).
See infra Appendix, CS MAMA § 3 “Prohibited Activities.”
See infra Appendix, CS MAMA § 3 “Prohibited Activities.”
See infra Appendix, CS MAMA § 2.
See Wheeler, supra note 140.
See Downing et al., supra note 101.
See infra Appendix, CS MAMA § 3 (a)(2)–(3).
See Limitations of the OCAA, supra Part II B(2)(c)(i).
See infra Appendix, CS MAMA § 3.
See infra Appendix, CS MAMA § 3.

February 2022

A NEW PRESCRIPTION FOR THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC

351

recklessness reflects the range of culpable mental states of the corporate actors
who engaged in the prohibited conduct. It also gives prosecutors additional
evidentiary tools to prove intent and thus a greater opportunity to hold corporate
wrongdoers to account. The expanded definition of intent will translate into just
punishment for wrongdoers, including those in executive positions within
pharmaceutical companies. It is also a disincentive to other corporate actors,
discouraging them from closing their eyes to what would otherwise be apparent.
Moreover, the CS MAMA allows for misdemeanor penalties for those who
negligently377 engage in the prohibited conduct. It is rational to adopt a criminal
negligence standard for conduct below the standard established to protect others
against unreasonable risk of harm. It allows those with a less culpable mindset
to be punished while avoiding the constitutional concerns that have arisen with
the FDCA penalties imposed based on strict liability under the Park Doctrine.
b. Rational Penalties
The penalties in the CS MAMA are designed to target and punish the
wrongful manufacturing, marketing, and distribution practices of
pharmaceutical companies and the individual corporate executives who
participated, encouraged, and ultimately benefited from the behavior.
(i) Individual Financial Liability for Executives
Under the existing legal frameworks, financial penalties under the FDCA,
FCA, and CSA have been factored into the cost of doing business in the
pharmaceutical industry.378 As discussed in Part II, they have created an
environment where it has been more profitable for pharmaceutical companies to
engage in misconduct and pay fees than it is to not engage in misconduct in the
first place. The CS MAMA will change that calculus. The CS MAMA subjects
a corporation found to violate the statute to a civil penalty in the amount equal
to 75% of the total profit such corporate entity made on lawful sales of regulated
substances in the United States during the period in which the corporate entity
engaged in dubious marketing or distribution practices.379 In addition, like the
OCAA, the proposed statute contains provisions that would impose personal
financial liability and prison time for executives who act with the requisite
knowledge.380 Prison time and financial fines for pharmaceutical company
executives will punish them and discourage other executives from engaging in
aggressive, unethical, or illegal drug marketing practices.

377.
378.
379.
380.

See infra Appendix, CS MAMA § 3(b)(2).
See sources cited supra note 232.
See infra Appendix, CS MAMA § 3(b)(1)(B).
See infra Appendix, CS MAMA § 3(b)(1)(A).
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(ii) Maximum and Minimum Prison Terms
The CS MAMA includes a maximum of “not more than 15 years” for
Schedule II drugs and “not more than 10 years” for Schedule III drugs if the
defendant is convicted of a felony violation of the statute.381 It also provides for
a maximum sentence of one year in prison for a misdemeanor conviction.382 The
statute also includes mandatory minimums of five years for a Schedule II felony,
three years for a Schedule III conviction, and six months for misdemeanor
convictions.383
Mandatory minimum sentences have been justly criticized in other
sentencing contexts because they have increased racial disparities in sentencing
and cause harm to lower-income communities and communities of color, who
are disproportionally targeted by these laws.384 Mandatory minimum sentences
for pharmaceutical executives, however, are different. They do not raise similar
concerns as nearly all pharmaceutical executives are affluent and have
significant legal and financial resources at their disposal to defend themselves;
they are not among those whom criminal laws have disproportionally
impacted.385 A minimum prison term is required so that powerful
pharmaceutical executives do not negotiate generous plea deals to avoid prison
time.
Mandatory minimum sentencing for white-collar pharmaceutical
defendants would respond to the complaint that “district court judges[] refus[e]
to impose harsh sentences on serious white-collar violators.”386 They would
also, among other things, provide a deterrent from engaging in misconduct.387
(iii) Revocation of Drug Exclusivity
Research and development for drugs require significant time and millions
of dollars in investment from pharmaceutical companies.388 Obtaining an
exclusive market for a drug allows those drug developers to recoup their
development expenses and generate profits from their monopoly in the

381. See infra Appendix, CS MAMA § 3(b)(1)(A).
382. See infra Appendix, CS MAMA § 3(b)(1)–(2).
383. See infra Appendix, CS MAMA § 3(b)(2).
384. Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Who Locked Us Up? Examining the Social Meaning of Black Punitiveness,
127 YALE L.J. 2388, 2391–92 (2018).
385. Cynthia A. Challener, Is the Pharma Industry Developing Cultural Intelligence?, PHARMA’S ALMANAC
(Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.pharmasalmanac.com/articles/is-the-pharma-industry-developing-culturalintelligence; Waseem Noor & Saule Serikova, Diversity and Inclusion: A Pharma 50 Perspective, PHARMA.
EXEC. (June 22, 2016), https://www.pharmexec.com/view/diversity-and-inclusion-pharma-50-perspective.
386. John D. Esterhay, “Street Justice” for Corporate Fraud-Mandatory Minimums for Major White-Collar
Crime, 22 REGENT U. L. REV. 135, 164–65 (2010) (demonstrating that white collar crimes receive lower
sentences than non-white collar crimes for the same guideline range).
387. Id.
388. PHRMA,
BIOPHARMACEUTICAL
RESEARCH
&
DEVELOPMENT
(2015),
http://phrmadocs.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/rd_brochure_022307.pdf.
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market.389 Similar to the OCAA, the CS MAMA revokes drug exclusivity for
statutory violations.390 If a company loses market exclusivity because of a
violation of the CS MAMA, other companies may sell generic versions of the
drug, taking market share from the company that developed it. Revocation of
exclusivity thus provides an incentive to ensure compliance with the proposed
statute.
(iv) Five-Year Revocation of Right to Engage in Direct-toConsumer Advertising
In addition to revoking market exclusivity, the CS MAMA would also
punish drug companies by revoking the offender’s right under the FDAMA391
to engage in DTC marketing for the violating drug for five years.392 DTC has
resulted in enormous profits for the industry.393
The five-year prohibition would also withstand constitutional scrutiny.
Although DTC marketing is commercial speech entitled to constitutional
protection,394 that protection is not absolute.395 The restriction proposed in the
CS MAMA is a valid restriction on commercial speech because “experience has
proved that in fact, such advertising is subject to abuse.”396 The ban on DTC
marketing in CS MAMA applies to a specific product once a pharmaceutical
company violated the law as to that product. Violating the law demonstrates that
the offending company is likely to abuse the privilege to advertise to consumers
directly. In addition, a restriction on DTC marketing may be justified based on
the government’s substantial interest in protecting consumers and ending the
389. Aaron S. Kesselheim, Michael S. Sinha & Jerry Avorn, Determinants of Market Exclusivity for
Prescription Drugs in the United States, 177 JAMA INTERN MED., 1685, 1658–64 (2017).
390. H.R. 2917 § 3(a); see also infra Appendix, CS MAMA § 5.
391. See Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105–115, § 421, 111 Stat.
2296, 2380 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 331(l) (2012)).
392. See infra Appendix, CS MAMA § 6.
393. Deweerdt, supra note 144, at S11. Another aspect of the American healthcare system that encourages
opioid prescriptions is that insurance plans tend to cover medications more frequently than they cover “pain
management approaches such as physical therapy.” Id.
394. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 557 (1980)
(explaining “[a]lthough the Constitution accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other
constitutionally guaranteed expression, nevertheless the First Amendment protects commercial speech from
unwarranted governmental regulation”).
395. In Central Hudson, the Supreme Court established a test to determine the constitutionality of
government regulation of commercial speech. Id. Under Central Hudson, government restrictions on
commercial speech are valid if the speech is unlawful or misleading and regulation of the speech is justified by
a substantial government interest, if the regulation advances that interest and is no more extensive than necessary
to achieve the government’s interest. Id. Rocket Learning, Inc. v. Rivera-Sanchez, 715 F.3d 1, 13–14 (1st Cir.
2013) (“For commercial speech to come within [First Amendment protection] it at least must concern lawful
activity and not be misleading.”). Turtle Island Foods SPC v. Soman, 424 F. Supp. 3d 552, 572 (E.D. Ark. 2019)
(explaining “‘[i]f the communication is neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity, the government’s
power is more circumscribed,’ and courts proceed with the remainder of the Central Hudson analysis”) (citations
omitted).
396. See In re R. M. J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982); Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 639 (6th
Cir. 2010).
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opioid epidemic.397 The five-year restriction on DTC in CS MAMA directly
advances the government’s interest because it disrupts the flow of false
information to consumers.
Further, the ban is no more extensive than necessary to promote the
government’s interest. The ban does not prohibit all advertising.398 It applies
narrowly to companies that have already violated the law and only for a limited
period. Pharmaceutical companies have consistently shown that lesser measures
such as fines are ineffective deterrents for their highly profitable misconduct.
Thus, the time-limited ban on DTC advertising for violating the statute is
constitutionally proportionate punishment for conduct.
c. Predicate Act Under RICO
CS MAMA also expressly provides that a violation of the act constitutes a
predicate act under RICO.399 As discussed in Part II, because RICO permits the
admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence of an individual’s association
with an organization, RICO is an attractive tool to address corporate fraud.400
RICO appears well suited to target pharmaceutical company executives, who
have learned to shield themselves from accountability for corporate misdeeds.
Adding a violation of the CS MAMA as a predicate act under RICO means that
pharmaceutical executives could be held liable for the misconduct of lower-level
corporate employees if prosecutors can demonstrate that the executive “either
gave a directive to engage in fraud, followed by a directive to do so, or extended
some sort of influence or control over the enterprise in its pursuit of profit from
the sale of prescription drugs through fraud.”401 Thus, prosecutors could
prosecute pharmaceutical executives for creating unlawful and unethical
corporate strategies, “[putting] the entire criminal enterprise on trial at once.”402
CS MAMA will succeed in RICO cases where other legal frameworks like
the CSA and FCDA have failed. As discussed in Part II, in Insys Therapeutics,
prosecutors have alleged CSA violations as predicate offenses only to vacate the
convictions for failure to prove intent. Indeed, the Insys case illustrated the
difficulty of using a CSA violation as a predicate act for RICO.403 As the court
observed in vacating the verdicts against the company founder John Kapoor, the
prosecutors failed to prove the requisite intent for a CSA violation.404 The CS
397. Opioid Overdose Crisis, NAT’L INST. HEALTH (Oct. 4, 2021), https://www.drugabuse.gov/drugtopics/opioids/opioid-overdose-crisis.
398. Blanket prohibitions on potentially misleading advertisements are generally disfavored. See, e.g., In re
R. M. J., 455 U.S. at 203; Loughlin v. Tweed, 310 F.R.D. 323, 335 (E.D. La. 2015).
399. See infra Appendix, CS MAMA § 7.
400. McCarthy, supra note 158, at 441.
401. Id. at 476.
402. Id. at 460 (explaining that RICO’s enterprise element will allow prosecutors to charge any individual
who commits two predicate acts that contributes to a pattern of fraud as a part of an organization).
403. Memorandum and Order on Defendants’ Motions for Judgment of Acquittal and for a New Trial at 19,
U.S. v. Babich, No. 1:16-cr-10343-ADB (D. Mass. 2016).
404. Id.
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MAMA avoids the problem that arose in Insys because the mens rea requirement
of CS MAMA is broader than the intent required in the CSA. Thus, the proposed
statute will be a viable tool for prosecutors to secure RICO convictions against
pharmaceutical executives that will survive judicial review, unlike those in Insys
Therapeutics.
2. Rehabilitation
In addition to punishing and deterring the pharmaceutical industry’s
marketing and distribution practices which paved the way for the opioid
epidemic, the CS MAMA contains provisions aimed at the penological goal of
rehabilitating, rebuilding, and improving the character of the industry. The
proposal includes provisions to mandate ethical and best practice standards for
the industry, re-invigorate the regulatory requirements governing drug research
and clinical trials, and prevent the conflicts of interest that have dominated the
sector.
A prerequisite to rehabilitation is a full accounting and review of which
industry prior practices exerted undue influence on government regulators.
Thus, the CS MAMA calls for a 9/11-style Blue Ribbon Commission to review
the prior practices of all government entities involved with the industry.405 The
CS MAMA requires the Commission to direct the Office of Inspector General
at the Department of Health and Human Services to examine the rules, practices,
and procedures of the FDA, DEA, and DOJ in regulating the industry concerning
opioids and to shine a light on how the government has failed to protect the
public. The Commission should recommend changes that executive branch
agencies can implement to protect the public and strike a better balance between
private sector interests and public health concerns.
To that end, the CS MAMA also tasks the FDA with forming a working
group charged with writing regulations that impose mandatory ethical and
research standards on pharmaceutical companies.
405. The federal government has previously established commissions to study the issue of opioid abuse and
addiction, including one established but later abandoned by President Trump. See Emily Dufton, Richard Nixon
Went to War on Marijuana. Donald Trump Is Making the Same Mistake with Opioids, WASH. POST (Apr. 20,
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2018/04/20/richard-nixon-went-to-war-onmarijuana-donald-trump-is-making-the-same-mistake-with-opioids. Various states and local communities have
also formed their own commissions to consider the issue. See, e.g., Press Release, Kansas Off. Dep’t of Health
& Environ., Strategic Plan Outlines Efforts to Address Opioid Crisis (Aug. 17, 2018),
https://khap2.kdhe.state.ks.us/NewsRelease/PDFs/08-17-2018%20Strategic%20Plan%20Outlines%
20Efforts%20to%20Address%20Opioid%20Crisis.pdf (describing the state of Kansas’ formation of a
commission to study and make recommendation to end the state’s opioid addiction crisis); The Mayors’ Blue
Ribbon Commission on Addiction, IFARGO (City of Fargo, N.D.), Spring 2017, https://download.fargond.gov/
0/ifargo_spring_2017_final.pdf (documenting the efforts of city of Fargo North Dakota to address the drug abuse
crisis in its city). Although designed to study the root causes of the epidemic, the entities constituted to
investigate these issues thus far have not focused on the pharmaceutical industry’s relationship with and
influence on the government. Russell J. Chibe & David B. Sudzus, America’s Opioid Crisis: Potential Increased
Regulation of Marketing, PHARMEXEC (Dec. 17, 2017), https://www.pharmexec.com/view/america-s-opioidcrisis-potential-increased-regulation-marketing.
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a. Mandatory Ethical Standards
As discussed in Part II, the FDA406 and the private industry trade
association PhRMA have developed ethical norms to guide pharmaceutical
companies and corporate actors. Although these guidelines provide
comprehensive direction on many ethical issues, compliance is voluntary.407
Given the state of the opioid epidemic, it appears that the FDA’s and
PhRMA’s ethical prescriptions have proven ineffective in altering behavior. The
CS MAMA will change that; the statute establishes an FDA committee and
working group to review existing voluntary ethical standards and develop ethical
standards that will be made mandatory as a condition of the drug approval
process.408
b. Updated Research and Clinical Trial Requirements.
As described in Part I, in the last fifty years, drug companies have taken
the lead in drug research and have exerted tremendous pressure on the FDA and
policymakers to water down the requirements for drug approvals. Much of the
effort has been directed at the rules governing clinical trials. Pharmaceutical
companies exercise “complete control over the design and execution of their
clinical trials.”409 Drug companies have used biased clinical trials and companyfunded, ghostwritten medical journal articles to create the dangerous
misimpression that their drugs are effective and safe.410 Companies have the
ability to report biased data in their favor by refusing to disclose all clinical data
from a study.411 Current rules also allow companies to ignore ineffective clinical
trials and only submit successful trials for consideration when seeking drug
approval.412 As discussed in Part I, some opioid manufacturers, including
Purdue Pharma, have used “enriched enrollment” protocols that allowed

406. Search for FDA Guidance Documents, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/regulatoryinformation/search-fda-guidance-documents (last visited Jan. 24, 2022).
407. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN, PRODUCT NAME PLACEMENT, SIZE, AND PROMINENCE IN PROMOTIONAL
LABELING AND ADVERTISEMENTS 1 (2017), https://www.fda.gov/media/87202/download; PHARM. RSCH. &
MFRS. OF AM., CODE ON INTERACTIONS WITH HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS 5 (2019), https://www.phrma.org//media/Project/PhRMA/PhRMA-Org/PhRMA-Org/PDF/A-C/Code-of-Interaction_FINAL21.pdf.
408. Although the scope and substance of the guidelines is a topic for another day, it is recommended that
ethical guidelines address the problems that led to the epidemic, including practices in marketing and distribution
of pharmaceutical products and conflicts of interest that arise when industry executives move back and forth
between careers in the private sector and the government.
409. McCarthy, supra note 93, at 48.
410. See supra Part I.B.2.; see also Elise Langdon-Neuner, Medical Ghost-Writing, 6 MENS SANA
MONOGRAPH 257, 259–60 (2008) (describing the history of ghost-written articles in the promotion of various
drugs); Natalie McGauran, Beate Wieseler, Julia Kreis, Yvonne-Beatrice Schüler, Heike Kölsch & Thomas
Kaiser, Reporting Bias in Medical Research - A Narrative Review, 11 TRIALS, no. 37, 2010, at 3 (reviewing the
history of reporting bias in clinical trials of drug interventions).
411. See Deanna Minasi, Note, Confronting the Ghost: Legal Strategies to Oust Medical Ghostwriters,
86 FORDHAM L. REV. 299, 306–07 (2017) (describing drug companies’ failure to disclose all data from clinical
trials even when required by a court order).
412. McCarthy, supra note 93, at 48.
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researchers to manipulate the outcome of clinical trials.413 These practices must
end.
The FDA guidelines and rules governing the clinical trial process must be
revised to eliminate the bias that has infected the drug approval process. The
FDA should develop and enforce regulations that require drug makers to
disclose all of the clinical trial data, not only cherry-picked data, for drugs in the
approval process. In addition, the FDA should disavow and disallow the use of
enriched enrollment protocols by the industry.
Moreover, the current system in which drug companies fund and control
all drug research is dangerous and irresponsible. Independent research is crucial
to ensuring that safe and effective drug therapies are developed and that
transparent drug trials are free from the influence and control of pharmaceutical
companies. The federal government must re-invest and re-engage in this arena.
And the industry should provide most of the funding for the work. Because the
federal government cannot fund and conduct independent drug trials for every
new drug, the CS MAMA creates a “Regulated Substance Rehabilitation Fund”
that drug companies must contribute to test and market their drugs.414
c. Slowing the Revolving Door Between Industry and The
Government
Another component to rehabilitate the industry and the government would
be to slow the revolving door between the pharmaceutical industry and its
regulators. Regulators and pharmaceutical executives can move freely and
quickly between jobs in the industry and the government. Although there has
been some legislative interest in curbing these practices,415 nothing specific has
been directed to ending these pharmaceutical industry practices. To address
these conflict of interest issues, the CS MAMA directs the federal employees
previously employed by drug makers to recuse themselves from any official
action that would provide a direct and substantial financial benefit for a recent
former employer, prohibits a federal employee from participating in matters that
involve an individual or entity with whom the employee is negotiating future
employment, and establishes a mandatory cooling-off period of least two years
during which federal employees must wait before accepting a role within the
pharmaceutical industry. Establishing these ethical rules will slow the
movement of personnel between the pharmaceutical industry and the FDA,
which invariably will help rid the government decision-making process of undue

413. Rosenberg, supra note 102.
414. See infra Appendix, CS MAMA § 3(e).
415. See S. 156, Executive Branch Conflict of Interest Act, 116th Cong. (2020), https://www.congress.gov/
bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/156/actions. The “Executive Branch Conflict of Interest Act” (H.R. 599/S. 156)
would curb many of these abuses by mandating recusal periods, prohibiting employer bonuses to those leaving
to take government positions, tightening lobbying rules and lengthening “cooling off” periods. The bill did not
advance out of the committee and expired at the end of December 2020.
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influence and bias. It will also help the regulators refocus on their public role
and build back confidence in the government.
3. Restoration and Reparation
In addressing the opioid epidemic, the CS MAMA omnibus charge justifies
including measures intended to restore and repair the damage done by the
industry’s conduct. Harmed communities and individuals have brought
thousands of civil cases in the federal and state courts against industry actors
that manufactured and marketed opioids.416 However, in addition to civil
liability for prior wrongdoing, the law needs to address the epidemic’s effects
going forward. As described in Part II, OCAA called for the creation of a fund
to pay those costs.417 CS MAMA improves upon that idea through the
“Regulated Substance Rehabilitation Fund.”418 In addition to funding derived
from an appropriation from the U.S. Treasury, the fund would collect all civil
penalties from violations of the law. It would also assess a fee to go into effect
after the enactment of the law in an amount established by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services from each entity seeking to market, manufacture, or
distribute any Regulated Substance covered by a federal health program.419 And
it would impose civil penalties for nonpayment of the fee.420 This funding could
be used, among other things, to pay for programs, projects, and activities to
combat the misuse and abuse of drugs, and to provide services to individuals
directly affected by the misuse and abuse of opioids. The fund would also be
used to pay for independent drug research and testing of new drugs.421
B. FEASIBILITY OF THE CS MAMA
The CS MAMA is a reimagining of the current approach to regulating the
pharmaceutical industry. As an omnibus legislative proposal, it reaches further
than any other prior proposal to address the broad range of pharmaceutical
company misconduct, targeting companies and executives and imposing both
criminal and monetary penalties for violation. As discussed, it is also designed
to look forward by establishing new guardrails and norms of conduct for the
industry and reconstituting and energizing the government’s regulatory role.
However, a question remains as to the measure’s workability—that is, whether
passing a statute like the CS MAMA is politically feasible.

416.
actors).
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.

See supra notes 5, 155 (describing the landscape of state and MDL civil cases pending against industry
H.R. 2917, 116th Cong. § 2(f) (2019).
See infra Appendix, CS MAMA § 3(e).
See infra Appendix, CS MAMA § 3(d).
See infra Appendix, CS MAMA § 3(d)(2).
See infra Appendix, CS MAMA § 3(e)(3).
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To be sure, the pharmaceutical industry retains its strong influence in the
political sphere through political contributions and lobbying efforts.422 In
addition, the COVID-19 pandemic has shifted society’s perception of the
pharmaceutical industry. In 2019, a Gallup poll found that 58% of Americans
viewed the pharmaceutical industry negatively, mainly because of the opioid
epidemic and high drug prices.423 One year later, at the height of the COVID-19
pandemic, the same poll found that only 49% of respondents expressed a
negative view of the pharmaceutical industry.424 Given the pharmaceutical
industry’s efforts to bring life-saving COVID-19 vaccines to Americans, the
shift in public opinion is not surprising.425 The pharmaceutical industry’s
positive response to the COVID-19 pandemic should not, however, dissuade
lawmakers from passing comprehensive legislation that holds the industry
accountable for the decades of devastation caused by the opioid epidemic. Even
as the pharmaceutical industry received praise for creating the vaccines, the
opioid epidemic has raged on, and overdose deaths have increased.426
Tremendous political will and energy will be required to take on the industry.
But its influence must find counterweight from activists, public health
advocates, healthcare practitioners, and academics who must continue to shed
light and attention on these issues and put pressure on policymakers and elected
officials.
Currently, developments in the executive and legislative branches suggest
that the CS MAMA is feasible. The election of Joe Biden as president and the
Democratic control of Congress make CS MAMA’s passage possible in the near
term. The Democratic Party’s expansive view of the government’s role in
healthcare and the private sector427 and its positive view of government
oversight428 mean that the changes proposed by CS MAMA may be viable.

422. Pharmaceuticals / Health Products, OPENSECRETS (Oct. 6, 2021), https://www.opensecrets.org/
industries/summary.php?ind=H04 (details statistics on financial contributions to elected officials by the
pharmaceutical industry); Elizabeth Lucas & Sydney Lupkin, Pharma Cash to Congress, KHN (May 22, 2020),
https://khn.org/news/campaign.
423. Annalisa Merelli, The Only Cure Strong Enough for Big Pharma’s Bad Reputation is a Covid-19
Vaccine, QUARTZ (Dec. 7, 2020), https://qz.com/1940201/pharma-companies-biggest-covid-19-profits-may-bein-reputation.
424. Id.
425. Robert Blum, Our Covid-19 Vaccine Hopes Hang on Drug Companies/ It’s time to Stop Demonizing
Them, NBC (Oct. 22, 2020, 8:34 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/our-covid-19-vaccine-hopeshang-drug-companies-it-s-ncna1244191.
426. Joan Stephenson, CDC Warns of Surge in Drug Overdose Deaths During COVID-19, JAMA (Jan. 5,
2021), https://jamanetwork.com/channels/health-forum/fullarticle/2774898; Overdose Deaths Accelerating
During COVID-19, CDC (Dec. 17, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2020/p1218-overdose-deathscovid-19.html.
427. See Views of Government, Constitution, American Exceptionalism, PEW RSCH. CTR. (May 4, 2011),
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2011/05/04/section-5-views-of-government-constitution-americanexceptionalism.
428. See Views of Government Regulation, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Feb. 23, 2012),
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2012/02/23/section-2-views-of-government-regulation.
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1. President Biden’s Campaign Initiatives
On his campaign website, President Biden promised to “[h]old accountable
big pharma[ceutical] companies, executives, and others responsible for their role
in triggering the opioid crisis,” and impose “[criminal liability] where
appropriate.”429 Specifically, President Biden proposes directing the DOJ to
bring criminal enforcement actions where needed, directing the DEA to “step up
its efforts to identify suspicious shipments,” and banning drug makers from
providing financial payments and incentives to healthcare providers.430 These
declarations offer promise for the CS MAMA.
However, because of the industry’s high-profile role in producing vaccines
for COVID-19, President Biden is unlikely to punish the pharmaceutical
industry for causing the opioid epidemic in the short term. President Biden has
been criticized for failing to act on the epidemic quickly enough.431 However,
once the pandemic abates, the country will be forced to reckon with its major
effects—one of which is the increased intensity of the opioid epidemic. The CS
MAMA provides provisions to address President Biden’s concerns raised during
his campaign. President Biden’s resolve, combined with a politically allied
Congress, could make passing and enacting comprehensive opioid legislation a
reality.
2. Developments in the Legislative Branch
In the last three years, hundreds of legislative proposals—more than 300
bills related to opioids in the 115th Congress alone432—were introduced. These
proposals represent a renewed determination to address the opioid crisis from
various angles, including improving education for doctors and the public,
bolstering treatment options and resources for individuals with opioid use
disorder, and regulating the distribution of opioids.433
Some new acts signed into law in 2018, like the SUPPORT Act434 and the
Using Data to Prevent Opioid Diversion Act,435 have been passed with bi429. The Biden Plan to End the Opioid Crisis, JOEBIDEN, https://joebiden.com/opioidcrisis (last visited Jan.
24, 2022).
430. Id.
431. The Biden Administration cancelled former President Trump’s plan to allow physicians to more easily
prescribe the opioid-treatment drug buprenorphine over “legal concerns over how it was implemented.” Brian
Mann, Biden Administration Criticized for Delay in Tackling Opioid Crisis, NPR (Jan. 26, 2021),
https://www.npr.org/2021/01/26/960860326/biden-administration-criticized-for-delay-in-tackling-opioidcrisis.
432. Keegan Williams & Jennifer Tribble, Using Data to Prevent Opioid Diversion Act of 2018 (HR 6491 /
S 2838, 115th Congress), SCI. POL. (Feb. 1, 2019), https://scipol.org/track/hr-6491-using-data-prevent-opioiddiversion-act-2018/using-data-prevent-opioid-diversion-act [https://perma.cc/XNB2-Q3WS].
433. Id.
434. Substance Use-Disorder Prevention that Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment (SUPPORT) for
Patients and Communities Act (Public Law 115-271), Pub. L. No. 115-271, 132 Stat. 3894 (2018).
435. Specifically, the Using Data to Prevent Opioid Diversion Act amends the CSA to require the attorney
general to provide information to drug manufacturers and distributors regarding opioid sales and distribution.
H.R. 6491, 115th Cong. (2018). Manufacturers and distributors are required to review this information and detect
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partisan support.436 In November 2020, a follow-on bill was introduced to
modify reporting requirements under the CSA.437 If enacted, the bill, entitled
Preventing Pill Mills Through Data Sharing Act (S 3070/HR 8732), would have
required drug manufacturers and distributors to report the sale, delivery, and
disposal of all controlled substances to the DEA every month, rather than
quarterly as is currently required.438 The legislation also extends the penalties
and reporting requirements that currently apply to drug manufacturers and
distributors.439 Even within the first two months of the 117th Congress, a bill
has already been introduced to combat the opioid crisis.440 The bill, introduced
by Representative Greg Stanton, seeks to amend the CSA to require dispensers
of opioids to include a warning that the drug can cause addiction.441
These new bills have garnered bipartisan support, demonstrating that
Congress is motivated to find solutions to combat the opioid epidemic. The 360degree approach of the CS MAMA provides benefits to all stakeholders and
constituencies, and it addresses the broad range of conduct that brought about
the opioid epidemic. Enacting the CS MAMA and similar statutes like the
PAPA442 will communicate that fighting the opioid epidemic is a top priority.
Democratic control of the federal government’s executive and legislative
branches offers the opportunity to convert that priority into reality.
CONCLUSION
Humans have been using and abusing opium for thousands of years, and
for more than one hundred years, healthcare professionals have prescribed drugs
derived from opium. Access to these highly addictive drugs has increased in the
last three decades, leading to an epidemic of opioid addictions. The scope of the
opioid epidemic in terms of lives lost and economic cost is staggering. It has
brought havoc and hardship to those addicted and their families and
communities443and has resulted in a cost to the national economy of hundreds
suspicious orders (for example, orders of abnormal size, orders that differ substantially from a normal
arrangement, or orders of unusual frequency) or unusual patterns of distribution.
436. Fox, supra note 305. Democratic Senator Elizabeth Warren said that the bill “makes common sense
changes that will help us in [the fight against the opioid epidemic],” while Republican Senator Greg Waldon
said that the legislation will “save lives.” Substance Use-Disorder Prevention that Promotes Opioid Recovery
and Treatment (SUPPORT) for Patients and Communities Act (Public Law 115-271). Id.
437. Preventing Pill Mills Through Data Sharing Act, S. 3070, H.R. 8732, 116th Cong. (2020).
438. Id.
439. Id. Companion legislation was previously introduced in the Senate in 2019 by Sens. Dianne Feinstein
(D-CA), Chuck Grassley (R-IA), Shelly Moore Capito (R-WV), and Dick Durbin (D-IL). S.B. 3070, 116th
Cong. (2019).
440. H.R. 1026, 117th Cong. (2021).
441. Id.
442. See Delfino, supra note 2 (The PAPA is aimed at criminalizing the conduct of over-prescribing doctors.
The PAPA will punish outlier prescribers who have stepped outside the bounds of legitimate medical treatment,
deter others from joining them by incentivizing appropriate prescribing practices, and will create space for other
healthcare professionals with legitimate medical justifications to prescribe opioids to treat patients.)
443. Prescription Opioid Data, CDC (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/
prescribing.html [https://perma.cc/ZMT6-Q9RD].

362

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 73:2

of billions of dollars.444 Although some responsibility for the epidemic lay with
healthcare professionals who prescribe the drugs and pharmacies that dispense
them, the lion’s share of the blame falls on the pharmaceutical industry.
Pharmaceutical companies paid for the scientific research on opioids, infiltrated
government spaces where drug laws and policies were enacted, and exploited
loopholes in the regulations. These companies pushed a false narrative about the
safety, efficacy, and lack of addictiveness of their drugs and unleashed schemes
to bribe and mislead prescribers. The industry deployed manipulative
advertising strategies to create a market for their drugs. Pharmaceutical
companies and their executives have carried out these schemes without regard
to their illegality. Although the federal government has regulated controlled
substances under laws such as the FDCA and CSA for more than half a century,
the laws and regulations have not proven effective in stopping these companies’
conduct. The few convictions obtained resulted in minor penalties that the
companies characterized as “the cost of doing business.” The companies paid
the fines and fees, resumed their behavior, and the epidemic has continued.
The 2020s, however, are an inflection point in the opioid epidemic.
Inspired by the urgency of the COVID-19 pandemic, a unique opportunity has
arisen to change the course of the opioid epidemic by enacting new laws like the
CS MAMA to hold the pharmaceutical industry accountable. The impact of the
COVID-19 pandemic on the opioid epidemic cannot be overstated. In addition
to dramatically increasing the rate of opioid addictions and death, the COVID19 pandemic has brought something else that will inadvertently assist in bringing
about changes in the law presented here. Like no other issue in the last fifty
years, the COVID-19 pandemic has singularly focused public awareness on the
healthcare system, including how the government collaborates with the
pharmaceutical industry. The operation of clinical trials and the minutia of the
drug approval process has captured the public’s attention. They have also
witnessed the inequities in healthcare delivery systems and the disparity in
access to medical treatment. Throughout the pandemic, the public has also
experienced the benefits and limitations of pharmacological responses to
disease. The attention, momentum, and clear-eyed determination arising from
these events, should not be permitted to dissipate. We must direct it to
transforming our response to the opioid epidemic and ending it. The CS MAMA
represents a significant step in that direction.

444. See Curtis S. Florence, Chao Zhou, Feijun Luo & Likang Xu, The Economic Burden of Prescription
Opioid Overdose, Abuse and Dependence in the United States, 2013, 54 MED. CARE 901, 901 (2016) (citing
estimates that the misuse of prescription opioids alone costs the United States $78.5 billion per year); see also
COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, THE UNDERESTIMATED COST OF THE OPIOID CRISIS 2 (2017) (concluding that the
economic cost of the opioid crisis reached $504 billion in 2015, representing 2.8% of the nation’s GDP).
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APPENDIX
A. THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE MANUFACTURER AND
MARKETING ACCOUNTABILITY ACT (THE “CS MAMA”)
PURPOSE: To hold pharmaceutical companies and their executives
accountable for their role in creating and exacerbating the opioid epidemic in the
United States and to deter companies from future misconduct in the distribution
and marketing of Schedule II and Schedule III controlled substances as defined
by the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801, et seq.
1. SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE
This Act may be cited as THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE
MANUFACTURER AND MARKETING ACCOUNTABILITY ACT (THE
“CS MAMA”)
2. SECTION 2. DEFINITIONS
“Regulated Substance” as used in this statute means a prescription
Schedule II, or Schedule III controlled substance as defined by the Controlled
Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801, et seq., the sales of which in the United States,
beginning on the date on which the drug was first eligible to be marketed in the
United States and ending on the date on which the manufacturer was found to
violate Section 2(b), has generated at least $1.
“medically reasonable” as used in this statute means a quantity of
Regulated substances as determined pursuant to Section 3, subdivision (c).
“know,” “knowing,” and “knowingly” as used in this statute means that a
person, with respect to information—
has actual knowledge of the information;
acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information; or
acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information.
“negligent,” “negligence,” or “negligently” as used in this statute means
the failure to exercise the standard of care that a reasonably prudent person
would have exercised in a similar situation.
“person” as used in this statute includes a natural person and a corporate
entity.
3. SECTION 3. PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES AND PENALTIES
(a) Prohibited Activities: It shall be unlawful for any person involved in the
manufacture or distribution of a Regulated Substance to engage in any and all
activities described in this Section 3 with respect to a regulated substance.
1. DUBIOUS MARKETING OR DISTRIBUTION PRACTICE WITH
RESPECT TO A REGULATED SUBSTANCE.—In this Section, the term
“dubious marketing or distribution practice with respect to a regulated
substance” means—
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(A) including in any advertisement, promotion, direct-to-consumer
marketing materials, or other marketing material a representation that a
Regulated Substance has no addiction-forming or addiction-sustaining liability
or has less of an addiction-forming or addiction-sustaining liability than one or
more other Regulated Substance, knowing the representation to be false as
determined by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (referred to in this
Section as the “Secretary”), in consultation with the Commissioner of Food and
Drugs (referred to in this Section as the “Commissioner”), based on research,
testimonials, and other evidence;
(B) knowingly supplying States or communities with a quantity of
regulated substances that the person knows is not medically reasonable; or
(C) failing to report to the Secretary any order or pattern of orders for the
distribution of regulated substances in a State or community that the person
knows are not being dispensed in a medically reasonable manner.
1.1 LIMITATION.—An act does not constitute a “dubious marketing or
distribution” practice with respect to a Regulated Substance, with respect to a
natural person—
(A) within the meaning of paragraph (1)(B), if such natural person can
demonstrate that they were not involved in the decision making regarding the
quantity of regulated substances to supply; or
(B) within the meaning of paragraph (1)(C) if such natural person knows
that the Secretary should reasonably be aware of the relevant order or pattern of
orders for the distribution of regulated substances.
2. PROVIDING FINANCIAL PAYMENTS OR INCENTIVES TO
PRESCRIBERS FOR PRESCRIPTION OF REGULATED SUBSTANCES.—
It shall be unlawful for a manufacturer of pharmaceuticals or any person acting
on its behalf to provide any doctor, nurse, health care provider, or prescriber of
medication any monetary incentive or gift in exchange for prescribing a drug.
3. MISREPRESENTATION OF SCIENTIFIC RESULTS.—It shall
constitute a violation of this statute for any drug manufacturer or any person
acting on its behalf to misrepresent research and studies in connection with the
drug approval process required under Section 505 of the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 355)
(b) Penalties.—
1. FELONY.—any person who violates Section 3 of this statute—
(A) if a natural person employed by a manufacturer or distributor of a
Regulated Substance, shall be—
(i) subject to a civil penalty in an amount equal to the sum of—
(I) such person’s full amount of salary for each year during which such
person engaged in dubious marketing or distribution practices with respect to a
product containing a regulated substance; and
(II) the amount by which the stock or other certificates of ownership
interest of the person that is owned by the individual has increased in value
during the period during which such person engaged in dubious marketing or
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distribution practices of a product containing a regulated substance, without
regard to whether the individual has sold any of the stock or certificates from
such manufacturer or distributor of a regulated substance; and
(ii) is guilty of a felony and is subject to a term of imprisonment—
(I) with respect to a violation involving a drug in Schedule II of Section
202 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 812), of not less than 5 years
but not more than 15 years; or
(II) with respect to a violation involving a drug in Schedule III of Section
202 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 812), of not less than 3 years
but not more than 10 years; or
(B) if a corporate entity shall be subject to a civil penalty in the amount
equal to 75 percent of the total profit such corporate entity made on lawful sales
of regulated substances in the United States during the period in which the
corporate entity engaged in dubious marketing or distribution practices.
2. MISDEMEANOR.—Any person who: (1) engages in the conduct
prohibited in Section 3 negligently, or (2) violates Section 4 of this statute, is
guilty of a misdemeanor. If a natural person employed by a manufacturer or
distributor of a regulated substance, the penalty shall be—
(A) a civil penalty in an amount equal to the sum of—
(i) 50 percent of the salary of the individual during the period that the
corporate entity engaged in dubious marketing or distribution practices and such
individual served as such an executive; and
(ii) 50 percent of the amount by which the stock or other certificates of
ownership interest of the corporate entity that is owned by the individual has
increased in value during the period that the corporate entity engaged in dubious
marketing or distribution practices and such individual served as such an
executive, without regard to whether the individual has sold any of the stock or
certificates; and
(B) is subject to a term of imprisonment—with respect to a violation
involving a drug in Schedule II or III of Section 202 of the Controlled Substances
Act (21 U.S.C. 812), of not less than 6 months but not more than 1 year.
(c) Rules for Application.—
1. QUANTITY OF REGULATED SUBSTANCES COVERED.
FORMULA.—For purposes of subparagraphs (B) and (C) of Section 3(a)(1),
the Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney General, and health care groups,
patient advocacy groups, and independent health care professionals (unaffiliated
with pharmaceutical companies, or trade groups or associations) using, if
applicable, data from the Automated Reports and Consolidated Ordering System
of the Department of Justice, shall establish a formula for determining the
quantity of regulated substances that is not “medically reasonable” with respect
to a community or State.
2. MEDICALLY REASONABLE QUANTITIES IN AN ORDER.
GUIDANCE.—For purposes of Section 3(a)(1)(C), the Secretary shall issue
guidance setting forth a procedure that manufacturers and distributors of
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regulated substances shall follow to recognize orders or patterns of orders for
the distribution of regulated substances that are not medically reasonable.
(d) Fees Applicable To All Opioid Manufacturers and Distributors.—
1. IN GENERAL.—As of the date of enactment of this statute, the
Secretary shall assess a fee against each corporate entity that manufactures or
distributes or seeks approval under Section 505 of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 355) for any Schedule II or III drug covered by a
Federal health program in amounts, for each such manufacturer or distributor,
determined by the Secretary through rulemaking.
2. WITHDRAWAL OF APPROVAL IN THE CASE OF NONPAYMENT
BY MANUFACTURER.—If a manufacturer assessed a fee under this
subsection fails to pay the full fee as required under paragraph (1), the Secretary
shall withdraw approval of the application under Section 505 of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 355) or deny any appending
application for approval under the FDCA, for the drug until the fee is paid in
full.
3. INVESTIGATION.—Immediately after the date of enactment of this
Act, the Secretary, acting through the Commissioner and in consultation with
the Attorney General, acting through the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement
Administration, shall begin an assessment to set fees under this subsection.
(e) Reimbursement of Economic Impact.—
1. ESTABLISHMENT OF FUND.—There is established in the Treasury
of the United States a fund, to be known as the “Regulated Substance
Rehabilitation” (referred to in this subsection as the “Fund”), to be administered
by the Secretary, in consultation with the Commissioner.
2. APPROPRIATIONS; TRANSFERS TO THE FUND.—
(A) APPROPRIATION.—There is appropriated, out of any monies in the
Treasury not otherwise appropriated, $20,000,000,000 to the Fund.
(B) TRANSFERS.—In a manner consistent with Section 3302(b) of title
31, United States Code, there shall be transferred to the Fund from the General
Fund of the Treasury an amount equal to—
(i) the amount of the civil penalties collected under subsection (c).
(C) AVAILABILITY.—Funds appropriated under paragraph (1) and
transferred under subparagraph (B) shall remain available until expended.
3. USE OF FUNDS.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary, in consultation with the
Commissioner, may, without further appropriation, use amounts in the Fund to
combat the misuse and abuse of Regulated Substances, which may include
transferring amounts from the Fund to other agencies to carry out programs,
projects, and activities of the agencies to combat the misuse and abuse of
Regulated Substances in the United States. The Fund will also be used to support
independent research on the efficacy and safety of drugs in the FDA drug
approval process.
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(B) AVAILABILITY.—Amounts transferred to an agency under
subparagraph (A) shall remain available until expended.
(C) SUPPLEMENT NOT SUPPLANT.—Amounts transferred to an
agency under subparagraph (A) to carry out programs, projects, and activities of
the agency shall supplement, and not supplant, amounts otherwise available for
such purpose.
4. SECTION 4. FDA STANDARDS COMMITTEE, MANDATORY
ETHICAL AND RESEARCH STANDARDS
FDA STANDARDS COMMITTEE.—The Secretary shall direct the FDA
to create a committee (“Committee”) tasked with developing
ETHICAL STANDARDS–mandatory ethical standards for the
pharmaceutical industry. The Committee shall create mandatory ethical
standards related to the marketing and distribution of pharmaceutical products.
The Committee shall review and update the standards annually. As a condition
of any drug approval pursuant to Section 505 of the FDCA (21 U.S.C. 355)
issued on or after the date of the enactment of this statute, the Secretary shall
require the applicant to agree to adhere to the mandatory ethical standards.
RESEARCH REQUIREMENTS.—Safety and efficacy criteria that each
drug must meet to qualify for approval by the Food and Drug Administration.
Such criteria will include a requirement that drugs containing a Regulated
Substance be evaluated by at least one independent research and study paid for
from the Fund provided in Section 3(e)(3)(A). “Independent” as used in this
Section means that the research and study do not receive funding from the
pharmaceutical industry or industry-related trade groups or associations.
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST.—No employee of the Food and Drug
Administration shall accept employment with or provide private consulting
services to any manufacturer or distributor of pharmaceutical products for 2
years after terminating employment with the FDA.
VIOLATION.—of this Section by any person shall be punished as a
misdemeanor pursuant to Section 3(b)(2).
5. SECTION 5. REDUCED EXCLUSIVITY
(a) In General.—If a drug manufacturer violates Section 3 with respect to
a Regulated Substance, effective on the date on which such manufacturer is
found to have so violated such Section—
1. REVOCATION.—Any remaining period of market exclusivity with
respect to such covered Regulated Substance shall be revoked;
2. REDUCTION.—The period of market exclusivity for any other
Regulated Substance for which such manufacturer is the holder of an approved
application under Section 505 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21
U.S.C. 355) or a license under Section 351 of the Public Health Service Act (42
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U.S.C. 262) shall be reduced to one half of the remaining period of market
exclusivity; and
3. PRODUCT HOPPING.—No new or additional exclusivity shall be
awarded to any regulated substance for which such manufacturer submits an
application for approval under Section 505 of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 355) or under Section 351 of the Public Health Service
Act (42 U.S.C. 262) or marketed as a result of product hopping.
(b) Definitions.—For purposes of this Section:
1. PERIOD OF MARKET EXCLUSIVITY.—The term “period of market
exclusivity” with respect to a drug means the total period of market exclusivity
granted under clause (ii), (iii), or (iv) of Section 505(c)(3)(E) of the FDCA (21
U.S.C. 355(c)(3)(E)), Section 505(j)(5)(B)(iv) of such Act, clause (ii), (iii), or
(iv) of Section 505(j)(5)(F) of such Act, Section 527 of such Act (21 U.S.C.
360cc), or paragraph (6) or (7) of Section 351(k) of the Public Health Service
Act (42 U.S.C. 262(k)), and any extension of such a period granted under
Section 505A or 505E of the FDCA (21 U.S.C. 355a, 355f).
2. PRODUCT HOPPING.—The term “product hopping” means a
reformulation of an approved drug or biological product that allows a
manufacturer to submit a new drug application under Section 505(b) of the
FDCA (21 U.S.C. 355(b)) or a new application for a license under Section 351(a)
of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 262(a)) and that—
(A) is intended for the treatment of the same medical condition as the drug
or biological product that was originally so approved; and
(B) is undertaken in conjunction with the sponsor’s actions to reduce or
eliminate the demand for the drug’s original formulation or biological product.
6. SECTION 6. REVOKE RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN DIRECT TO
CONSUMER MARKETING
(a) In General.—If a drug manufacturer violates Section 3 with respect to
a Regulated Substance, effective on the date on which such manufacturer is
found to have so violated such Section, the right to engage in direct to consumer
advertising of the Regulated Substance shall be revoked for a period of 5 years
from the date of the judgment;
(b) Definitions.—For purposes of this Section:
(1) DIRECT TO CONSUMER MARKETING.—”Direct to consumer
marketing” refers to any and all marketing and advertising of a covered regulated
substance in any magazine, newspaper, newsletter, radio station, television
station, or internet website that reaches an audience of non-healthcare
professionals.
7. SECTION 7. VIOLATION OF THIS STATUTE SHALL CONSTITUTE
A PREDICATE ACT PERSUANT TO THE RACKETEER
INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT, 18 U.S.C.
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§ 1961 ET AL.
Any violation of any provision of this Act shall constitute “racketeering
activity” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).
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